Some talk on a Taliban proposal that it would sever ties with al Qaeda in return for withdrawal of foreign troops.
This seems to me like a very clever strategic move by the Taliban. If the US says no, the argument that they are there to safeguard against further 9/11 style attacks begins to disolve. If they say yes, then the Taliban get exactly what they want.
The initial response seems to have been to query the credibility of the offer, that is the willingness and/or ability of the Afghan Taliban to separate from al Qaeda. Apparently Mullah Omar has interpreted this response as a rejection.
For me this offer is credible. The Taliban managed to stop poppy farming for a short while. The fact that immediately post 9/11 they refused to give up bin Laden just shows them to be true to their word. If they agree such a deal (with a credible, perhaps a Saudi, broker) I do not think they would betray their word.
Question is, what will the US do. This is an under reported development. Does that mean the Obama administration does not want to accept the offer, but feels it cannot turn it down either?
The offer could also signal some level of division in the jihadis. I doubt the Pakistani Taliban would be overjoyed at such a deal. There must also be a few foreign fighters in Afghanistan feeling a little less secure.
Could the ISI in Pakistan have brought some pressure to bear on their erstwhile allies, or could the Pakistani Taliban’s attacks on military targets helped to open some sort of gap between Talibs on either side of the border?
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Dafydd, why do you think this offer is authentic? OBL married Mullah Omar’s daughter and Mullah Omar married OBL’s daughter. Will Mullah Omar really turn on OBL, Zawahiri, LeT, JeM, LeJ, Sipah e Sahaba, Jundullah, Haqqani, TTP, TNSM, Lashkar al Zil, Iyas Kashmiri’s brigade 313, and the two Uzbek groups? Does the Quetta Shura really have the capability of doing anything like this, especially since some members (Haqqani is a member after all, even though he is autonomous) are closely linked to international extremism? The Quetta Shura has limited influence in the East of Afghanistan.
Is the QST really offering the ANA, ANP and GIRoA a cease fire?
Dafydd, I am surprised you see this as anything other than a stunt to persuade ISAF to withdraw support from the ANSF. Unless the ANA general staff believe the offer is authentic, how can we assume it is?
If the Taliban wants in, shouldn’t it participate in the 2010 Parliamentary and local elections? Otherwise how can the war between the ANSF and Taliban ever end?
Just as a point of information, this whole cross-shared marriage between Mullah Omar and Bin Laden simply is not true. I live in Kandahar (and have done so for the past two years), working as a researcher on precisely this period of history, and there is no evidence for this marriage ever having taken place. Let’s end this rumour once and for all.
Besides, the offer was not to ‘meddle’ in other countries’ affairs.
I too that to mean bin Laden was no longer in Afghanistan, therefore the issue of a handover wouldn’t arise.
Furthermore, I don’t recall any offer of a ceasefire to Afghani forces. I would expect that the Taliban to continue their campaign to reinstate the ‘Islamic Emirate’, regardless of election results.
How do you reconcile all the OTHER statements leading up to this one saying “we don’t talk until they’re gone” (not “we don’t talk until they START TO GO”, a more recent nuance from an (alleged) unofficial spokesperson – more here )? Hard to make an offer when you won’t even talk, no?
Of course the Taliban will say they’ll break with al Qaeda if the US leaves and allows them to retake Afghanistan and put it back the way it was in 1996-2001!
I see no way to trust the Taliban leadership, though I do think there is value in working with local Afghan lower level Talibs.
Does anyone think the US would pull out all their troops and trust Omar and the rest of the bunch?
I don’t think the Taliban believes this, this is all a game to them to try to regain power over Afghanistan so they can bring back their horrific regime.
It’s a clever infowar move by the boys in Quetta, but then again they’re far from stupid.
Another question is, will as many of the current Taliban fighters support the actual Taliban program once the Americans are gone? For once, their own regional loyalties coincides with that of the “Taliban” agenda, but that may no longer be the case after a NATO withdrawal.
Porter’s observations on this matter from a strategic level are interesting, but I think there are some other considerations. How will the Haqqani Network, for instance, respond to moves by the Quetta Shura to engage in dialogue with the US? And what about the other half-dozen groups that make up “the insurgency”? I think moves in this direction would trigger some fracturing among groups that ostensibly follow the Quetta line but do so only because it suits them. And so on.
Toaf,
this fracturing would likely occur in the event of the US seeking to enter negotiations based on this offer. If they maintain their dignified silence, or give a more definite ‘no’, I just don’t see it being a problem.
As I noted abovejust the making of the offer may signal some level of disconnect between Pakistani and Afghani insurgents.
Indians want Americans and Europeans tangled with Afghan imbroglio to further their own strategic game. For that, they are ever busy spreading disinformation about Afghan people, especially Pashtuns. Americans should seriously review their goals and strategy regarding their Afghan occupation. Now that it has turned into a stalemate, a peaceful solution will certainly suit to both sides, i.e. the Westerners and the people of Afghanistan. Death and destruction will definitely result in increasingly more violence, deeper involvement and wider commitment on part of the occupation forces. American led NATO forces will leave Afghanistan in one, five, ten, or twenty years but Afghan resistance forces, Afghan Taliban being only one such group, are here to stay forever. Completely subduing Afghans has historically been proved to be impossible a mission for foreign occupation forces. Another thing that many people tend to ignore is the fact that the regional powers to be (read Russia and China) would never allow the occupation forces to gain a full and effective control in Afghanistan. I believe these powers can turn the tide in Afghanistan and get the foreign forces packing in a year or so but they want to keep the occupation forces engaged at a measured pace to extract the maximum cost. If the history of Afghanistan has any lesson to offer then that is the fact that it is always the occupation forces that lose stamina in Afghanistan. More often, by then, it gets too late.
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