Democracy in Kyrgyzstan – did it come too early and is it too expensive to afford?

Democracy in Kyrgyzstan – did it come too early and is it too expensive to afford?

Since the ousting of Askar Akayev, one of the most democracy-friendly authoritarian rulers in Central Asia in so-called ‘Tulip Revolution’, the hope for democracy has been steadily declining despite all the initial euphoria. The most resent analysis of this failure (by Bishkek-based Ben Judah) came up on the International Relations and Security Network website. By observing several tendencies such as suppression of freedom of assembly and press, rising religious bigotry, and the lack of competitiveness in recent presidential elections, the author informs us that the democracy in trouble in Kyrgyzstan.

The disappointing tendencies are, in the view of the author, the rise in Islamic radicalism, increasing rapprochement with Russia, clanism and nepotism, and uncertainty.

A question begs an answer: Why democracy is failing in this country which promised so much?

These tendencies listed above are not the causes but the consequences of grand socio-economic failure which is taking place in a larger environment (influenced by many domestic, regional, and international factors) than just Islam vs. Democracy settings.

The process in Kyrgyzstan can be analyzed by typical three processes of democratization: 1. The end of an authoritarian regime; 2. The installation of a democratic regime. 3. The consolidation of the democratic regime.

The end of an authoritarian regime per se does not mean the installation of a democratic regime. A mild, pro-reformation authoritarian regime which was hailed as an ‘island of democracy’ was overthrown by mass riots. The installation of a democratic regime means locking-in democratic rules of the game (competing and rotating nature of power transition) in the legislature, the success or failure of which in Kyrgyzstan is up in the air for scrutiny. I am not arguing here that democratization did not happen, but that the final, consolidating stage of democratization failed in Kyrgyzstan due to the nature of certain economic and social factors beyond the influence of the actors such as relatively weak ‘elite’, limited economic potential of the country, very ‘thin’ middle class, and regional and global constraints such as land-lockedness, economic dependence on regional countries, high pressure from global actors. Both pro and anti modernization scholars concur that democracy has a less chance of survival under poor economic conditions. There is limited evidence about whether democracy helps nations to become wealthier, but it tends to suit wealthier countries better because they have a large middle class.

How did the ‘change’ (let us use it since Obama made sexy) happen in Kyrgyzstan? For such change to happen there must be huge angry mass ready for large-scale mobilization and weak elite who are unable to repress and too deceitful to be trusted again because of repeated failures on fulfilling earlier promises. Askar Akayev’s regime won the ironical title of ‘the island of democracy’ not because they were better than their other counterparts in Central Asia, but because they were more constrained by economic shortcomings and more severe socio-political cleavages which made Niyazov-style repression too costly and simply unaffordable.  Given these constraints as well as the West with its ‘carrots and sticks’, weak Russia, and disengaged China, making concessions in the form of democratic reforms was the only viable choice for the Akayev regime for holding on to the power. The magnitude of concessions in Kyrgyzstan was so big compared to its neighbors because it was the most constrained regime. This strategy which earned them short-term international approval and even local pride, but paradoxically had gradually been eroding the legitimacy of the regime.

Unfulfilled promises made simply as concessions rather than true commitments soon lowered the credibility of the regime in the eyes of its citizens. Resources were so scarce that made it difficult to keep all the elite happy and some of them even deserted to the side of the citizens (and NGO-led frontline of Western propaganda) in hopes of capturing power by manipulating mass mobilization.

The collaboration of defected elites and frustrated people has led to mass mobilization and overthrow of the weak regime. It was successful because the defected elites knew the weak points of the regime. After the old authoritarian regime had been overthrown, the installation of a democratic institution did not happen as it should have been because it was not the ultimate purpose of the defected elite. They intentionally left important loopholes in the new legislation which prevented locking-in the competitive and rotating nature of power. Once in power, defected elites resorted to repression because they knew people cannot mobilize en masse so soon again. Moreover, recovered Russia and more regionally integrated China started to pledge their support to the government of defected elites in the name of public order and security. These factors combined with poor economic potential of the country and very little middle class made repression affordable for the new ruler and prevented the consolidation of democracy in Kyrgyzstan.

Growth of religious bigotry is not nowhere in this analysis. It is simply the result of economic hardships and political repression. Such radical forms of Islam are not native to Central Asia and imported extremist ideologies be it Wahhabism or Communism breeds in repressive societies with high income inequalities and social injustice because they offer ‘justice’ on either class or religious basis. Democracy did consolidate in economically advanced former communist states as well as countries with Muslim or Buddhist populations, therefore, there is no basis even to suggest that one type of religion stymies and another type of religion fosters democracy. Just as decreased income inequality and increasing middle class ensured the consolidation of democracy in certain Eastern European countries, it sure can happen in Central Asia as well. However the way to go for it is not through all sorts of revolutions but through economic development.