And by opposing end them?

With the White House admirably standing in for Elsinore castle of late, we are nevertheless  inching closer to a decision on Gen. McChrystal’s request for additional troops.  The lobbying from all sides continues and while there are many uncomfortable dynamics about the lengthy deliberations, at least we are finally seeing a healthy debate about the overall strategic aims of the mission in Afghanistan.  Much as one might have a soft spot for the formur POTUS’s  unequivocal Texan approach, there really was not much of a debate in high policy circles about the ends and means of the mission from about 2004 onwards (NATO having jumped into the water at that time with both toes).

I firmly believe the population-centric COIN approach is the way to go, although it is going to be extremely difficult in its application and challenged by the limited patience of politicians and publics back home.  The case for a pure hunt and kill CT mission makes some sense in the Pakistani tribal areas since we are not able to project persistent force there (without disaster unfolding), but even that makes no sense to me without the partnered COIN operation in Afghanistan.  I simply don’t see how a CT only mission, in AFPAK at large I guess, could work in practice, and how it could yield anything more than very limited results.  The questions of logistics and HUMINT become much more difficult once you are effectively operating from outside the region.

In any case the President’s task of selling the necessity of the war has been made all the much harder by the long deliberations and public support for the war that is dwindling rapidly.  Some of that can probably be reversed with a coherent strategy articulated by the great communicator (small “g”), but that must include a description of what success will look like and how we will get there.

All politics being local, he will also have to contend with resistance from some within his own party; Senator Russ Feingold having made up his mind long ago that this whole venture is a waste of time.

“The idea that the Taliban is going to see it as in their interest to have the world headquarters of al Qaeda back in Afghanistan I think is very dubious.”

Disagreeing firmly with that point of view, I was more interested to see that the President of East Timor is weighing in with his views on a comprehensive deal with the Taliban – particularly as reconciliation is an issue close to my heart.

“The goal of negotiations should be a settlement whereby each side achieves its main objectives: for the U.S., depriving al Qaeda of a launching pad and cementing the democratic gains in Afghanistan since 2001; for the Taliban, securing the departure of the U.S. Washington must clearly state the conditions for a U.S. troop withdrawal, including the dismantling of al Qaeda bases, the detention or expulsion of all its insurgents from the country, and the guarantee of an end to the persecution of Afghan women and children.”

However, it soon becomes clear how this Nobel Peace Prize winner’s views of ground realities in Afghanistan are almost as divorced from reality as those of the Hon. Senator from Wisconsin.  The government of Afghanistan has very little to offer the Taliban leadership in light of their non-negotiable and extremist views of what such a settlement would have to look like.  Also, with the Taliban having the upper hand in the current conflict (and they absolutely do) they have little incentive to even consider such talks.

Al Qaeda need the Taliban more than the Taliban needs them, but accounts such as by David Rohde and my own much less-exciting experience on the ground indicate that the relationship is much more than that of a paying guest and a host.  The neo-Taliban, as Guistozzi has admirably documented, has ambitions beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and their world-view is very similar to that of Al Qaeda – by virtue of osmosis perhaps.