Dog bites owner, AFPAK game changer?

When Pakistani Taliban militants moved aggressively into Buner district this Spring there were signs of real discomfort in Islamabad.  The diverse strains of militancy in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas had for as long as one can recall been manipulated, coddled, and even controlled by parts of the Pakistani government in order to further their own strategic aims in the region.  With the move into Buner, and increasingly daring attacks in Pakistan proper this useful Rottweiler seemed to be turning on its owner.

The result was a Pakistany army push into Buner, which militants quit in April, and other high profile operations in the Swat valley designed to bring the Pakistani Taliban to heel.  Such operations had in past years proved costly staged events that ultimately ended in “peace agreements” whereby the Pakistani state withdrew its tendrils from tribal areas and acquiesced to full militant control once more.  The operations in Swat and Buner appeared more determined and there was strong signalling from Islamabad that the army was there to reassert state control, full stop.

Now that the Pakistani army has played its long-open hand and is inching its way into S-Waziristan, one therefore wonders what the implications are on both sides of the border.

With regard to Afghanistan it is likely that the implications will be temporary and limited.  There will be some bleed of insurgent forces across the border into Paktika and Khost, where they are able to operate with significant freedom, but Pakistany army blocking positions on the border (the anvil to the hammer of the advancing force) and reported nonaggression agreements with militant groups focused on cross-border attacks into Afghanistan will likely limit this.  Refugee flows depend largely on how far North the pakmil advances and what resources will be available to IDPs inside Pakistan (here locals will be aware of what was provided, or not, to IDPs from the Swat operations).

As for my stomping grounds in old Loya Paktia the effect will be negligible since the Haqqani mini-state in North Waziristan is the center of gravity of militant operations there.  The chances of the army taking over South Waziristan (and North even) on a permanent basis, implementing full state control and rolling back the tribal administration (read. autonomy) are nil.  David Ignatius is more hopeful here:

If the Waziristan campaign does succeed, it would create an important new dynamic in the region. Rather than a weak Pakistan that doesn’t control its Afghan border, we might see a strong Pakistan that — by securing its tribal areas — can be a more effective partner in neighboring Afghanistan. That would be a big boost for the United States, but to work, it must be labeled “Made in Pakistan.”

Therefore the best outcome of this for Afghan counterinsurgents will be temporary discomfort for militants in their safe areas, and perhaps opportunities to find and strike high-value targets with drones as they are dislocated (the one potential major win I can see).

On the Pakistani side of the Durand line things are less clear-cut.  If the Pakistani army inflicts enough pain, is able to clamp down on the constant attacks in Pakistan proper, and comes to some arrangement with bloodied militants for ongoing tribal control of their areas; they might come out of these operations in a more stable strategic position (quite a few ifs in there, I know).

It’s worth remembering that the strategic needs and goals of Pakistan and Afghanistan-cum-the-West are radically different.  This is a prism through which I try to view events in Pakistan in general when considering their impact on the Afghan campaign.