When discussing the possibility of the IJU being a faked terror group, I declared the IMU inactive in Northern Afghanistan. After Namangani died and Yoldashev fled to Waziristan in 2001, I said, there hasn’t been an IMU presence up near Kunduz. Well. A friend working in Balkh wrote to me about that, and mentioned something I haven’t heard in the news yet:
In the Uzbek areas of northern Afghanistan, we’ve been hearing the IMU and Tahir Yuldash invoked more and more often over the past year. The IMU name has shown up on night letters, and local government figures (initially dismissive) are now publicly claiming that Yuldash is behind the recent escalation of insurgent activity in Jawzjan province — especially in southwestern Darzab district and Qush Tepa district, where anti-government forces carried out a dramatically successful assassination of the district governor, police chief, and head of intelligence back in March.
It’s been under-reported so far this year, but insurgent activity has reached several previously quiet areas of Sar-i-Pul and Jawzjan. This appears to be in part an attempt by anti-government forces in Badghis province (where security deteriorated so dramatically last year) to create a new arc of instability connecting Badghis to western Balkh, where insurgency, crime, and narcotics have simmered for years.
The recently paved highway between Maimana and Shiberghan has been hard going for the insurgents; they’ve managed some successful police post attacks, but most of their culvert IEDs have been reported by unsympathetic locals, who warn off the intended targets. So the advance has apparently left the highway, and is instead going through the deserts and remote hills of Faryab to crop up in Darzab, Qush Tepa, Sayyad, and Sar-i Pul districts.
The Taliban are remembered with loathing by most of the non-Pashtun population between Faryab and Balkh. This is probably why the IMU “brand” has been coming back into fashion, regardless of whether Yuldash’s gang is actually involved. We’re a long way from seeing Ahmed Rashid’s darkest fears realized… but whoever’s really involved in it, the erosion of security in the majority-Uzbek provinces of Afghanistan is worrying, and worth watching.
Well, there you have it: worth watching. I certainly will be. I am interested by the idea of a Taliban-affiliated group re-branding itself to make its activities seem more acceptable. It’s kind of like the reports I saw of violent activity in the Tagab being pinned on Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin regardless of who actually did it—it was a way of attaching more notoriety to an action than it would otherwise earn. Obviously this sort of rebranding would be for the opposite effect, but it’s nevertheless a reminder of the damning complexity of this war.
Previously:
Is the IJU faked?
Oh, actual terrorists
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Yes, I subscribe to what your friend in Balkh has indicated. Uzbek fighters identifying themselves as “IMU” fighters have created advisory cells in northwestern Badghis province, with at least six such individuals in charge of training small unit tactics and bomb-making techniques. Narcotics, a slight issue in the unstable districts (and controlled by the Taliban) of Balamurghab and Ghormach has risen this year to over 800 hectares, up from last year’s estimated 550 hectares. Take it for what it’s worth, but Gretchen Peter’s investigation suggests the IMU is not only heavily involved in drug trafficking, but controls nearly 70% of the narcotics flow through Uzbekistan. This could be another reason Uzbek criminals or “fighters” are poking their heads around the desolate hills of Badghis.
One such region to watch nearby is Faryab’s Shirin Tagab district, not far from the provincial capital. Beginning last year, villagers and government forces have exchanged a violent tit-for-tat that has left dozens killed, including district level officials such as the NDS and Police Chief. The Taliban were also targeted, sometimes by the help of locals, who helped kill the Taliban’s “shadow” deputy governor and others. It appears the violence escalated after local elders reported a ten-ton weapons and rockets cache located in the district to ISAF authorities. Afterward, the Taliban increased their attacks throughout the district in an apparent revenge for losing such as large weapons depot, although this is only speculative.
Additionally, some “spectacular” attacks have been recorded in Jawzjan this year as indicated by the Balkh friend above, including high level assassinations of all sorts and the targeting of aid workers and cell phone towers. Kunduz is particularly worrisome, especially as the Taliban continue to consolidate their forces within a 10-15 mile radius around Kunduz City. If any amount of NATO supplies is expected to be driven through Tajikistan across the US Army Corps of Engineer’s constructed ($37 million) bridgeway, then the Taliban northeast of Kunduz City will become a major hinderance to the current mission. Germany currently has 667 troops stationed in Kunduz province, that’s nearly one soldier for each of the province’s schools which are also being systematicaly targeted by the Kunduz Taliban (10 have been shut down so far according to provincial authorities). Not long ago, reports whirled around describing 2 Uzbek fighters thought to be “IJU” operatives being arrested in the Kunduz area.
Unfortunately the northern territories of Afghanistan do not get the amount of attention, both in a security and analytical sense that it needs. Thanks for posting your friend’s timely comments and for updating the specter of the “IMU.”
Re GP’s claim in the previous comment:
If the IMU controls 70% of the drugs trafficked through Uzbekistan then “IMU” must stand for “friends of the government of Uzbekistan,” which the IMU (what remains) is most certainly not.
Christian: bingo.