I was digging through my computer tonight for a link I had stashed away some time ago and ran across a file called “The Winter of NATO’s Discontent (Spiked).” It was an old column I had submitted somewhere that was rejected for some reason. Opening it, I could see why, as it was kind of rough and didn’t flow very well or really have a conclusion. Even so, I found myself nodding to it during the scene setting, thinking “huh, I still agree with this.” The modified date on the file—that is, the last time it was touched—was February 2, 2007.
Now, this isn’t really to hype myself as being oh-so-clever. Rather, I had completely forgotten about this, and it’s weird to see some things turn out right (e.g. the war continuing to get worse because the Army doesn’t get it), and some turn out incredible wrong (the advocacy of creating “safe zones” as a foundation for an ink-spot strategy). Considering where we are today in the Afghan campaign, it’s important to remember just how new the current crop of leadership is: two years ago was the beginning of both SecDef Gates’ tenure, and the early days of the rise of General Petraeus. Here’s how it began:
Since September of 2006, Taliban attacks against NATO forces have increased nearly three-fold. Yet the deteriorating security in Afghanistan has been little more than background noise since the invasion of Iraq, and as a result is in serious danger of falling apart. Only under a new Defense Secretary has a sense of urgency returned. Sensibly, Robert Gates has called for an increase in the number of troops in the country, but this is at best a simplistic answer to a very complex problem. In fact, it is likely a half-hearted “surge” in Afghanistan would make things worse. Any kind of solution to the multiple problems facing the country must involve a radical change in tactics and strategy, as the current state of affairs has placed unacceptable restrictions on the reconstruction work.
Amazing how little seems to have changed in two years, right? What followed was a discussion of the problems stemming from NATO countries’ caveat on troop deployments (a problem since beaten to death in this space), and the impossibility of matching the Army doctrine-mandated troop concentrations to run an effective counterinsurgency (again, since beaten to death in this space). But what was interesting was how strongly I argued for a “smarter” force:
The Coalition’s current strategy seems to involve sweeping through an area, clearing out whichever Taliban militants stick their heads out, throwing money at the local jirga and moving on to the next hot spot. In its wake it leaves Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are meant to rebuild infrastructure and institutions destroyed by the decades of civil war. This, however, has proven ineffective—multiple reports on the ground indicate Taliban fighters simply run away into the hills when NATO comes by, only to descend at night to terrorize the locals. Many of the PRT teams in the south and east are so severely restricted on travel outside their base it’s doubtful their absence would even be noticed.
Anyway, so it’s fun to see that in two years, the basic situation in Afghanistan has not changed even a little, except for Afghans themselves being more frustrated at the status quo and a massively increased anger at the increasingly common civilian casualty incidents. In other words, three commanders later, Afghanistan is the same as it’s been since 2006, only worse off.
Great.
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