New Four Star General Stanley McChrystal recently ordered the fifth strategic review in five months of the Afghanistan war, presumably because the previous four were lacking in some way. Needless to say, I remain unimpressed with what’s come of that—right down to he and his commanders’ seeming ignorance of his predecessors who ran the war, and the blood lust trickling through the O5s eager to get their Bagram combat patches.
But Judah Grunstein just highlighted something I missed, and it is devastating:
“We are going to look at those parts of the country that are most important — and those typically, in an insurgency, are the population centers,” McChrystal said in an interview shortly after pinning on his fourth star. . . .
McChrystal’s comments suggested that he wanted to pull forces out of some of the more remote, mountainous areas of Afghanistan where few people live and where insurgent fighters may be seeking refuge. In recent months these isolated pockets have been the scene of some of the most intense fighting between U.S. troops and insurgents.
Grunstein is appropriately skeptical of this plan, and notes that this is quickly resembling lipstick on a pig of a war (obviously not his phrasing). Let me do him one better: this is how you guarantee a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan. The main reason? The last army to do an “ink stain” approach to Afghanistan were the Soviets, who felt that the population was in the cities, so if they just controlled the cities the countryside would fall into line. Now, while they did things we would never do to make that easier—like mining, bombing, and salting vast tracts of the countryside so people would flee to the cities for shelter—I would think it basic knowledge that thinking all you need are a few cities and—voila!—Afghanistan is yours.
Quick review: where is the insurgency most strongly concentrated?
a) Kabul
b) Jalalabad
c) Kandahar
d) Herat
e) Mazar-i Shaif
The correct answer is NONE OF THE ABOVE. The Taliban are not strongest in the cities, but outside of them: you’ll find the insurgency grinding in the hills above Lashkar Gah, the countryside to the west and north of Kandahar, the plains of Zabul, the Khost bowl, the mountains of Paktya and Paktika, and the narrow valleys from Kapisa to Kunar and Nuristan. None of them are urban, or even sort of urban.
Unfortunately, this has CNAS written all over it. It would be surprising if some of their people weren’t involved in the new review in some way—I really hope they’ve learned by now that Afghanistan is not urban, that the insurgency—and the people—are scattered into small rural communities throughout the country. Securing the cities has never been the Coalition’s weakness.
Rather, our primary weakness has been staging ridiculous displays of force with zero plan for follow-up. (What’s with bragging about seizing 1.3 tonnes of bagel topping, or calling Babaji the last Taliban stronghold? Do they think no one else notices they’ve barely held Gereshk and have no control in Musa Qala, Nadi Ali, or Sangin, to say nothing of Panjwai next door?)
Missing in all the hype about the biggest air assault evar is any plan to secure the population—now that they’ve chased away the Taliban (which they really haven’t, as locals have already complained that they’re back), who replaces the so-called “shadow government” of micro-finance institutions, police, judges, and so on? You can’t do that from Camp Bastion, nor can you do it from the firebases at Kajakai. Where is the plan to move things forward?
Indeed, this story has been told in Kapisa, in Khost, in Kunar, and in Kunduz. Everywhere you look, we demonstrate tremendous military prowess and what can only be called an anti-competence at everything that must happen after the fighting. You see it in the multitude of plans to abandon and eventually “retake” entire districts—an idea hatched with little regard for what it does to the people who live there and must face the militants after everyone goes home to their local Box. You see it everywhere—right down to the frustrations of ETTs being held on their base because they can’t get permission to go assist their Afghan brethren in a firefight (which also happens with depressing regularity).
In fact, and this is on the verge of being a rant on a topic too big to cover in one post, so far each new decision coming out of the Pentagon about how to “fix” Afghanistan has left me more and more pessimistic. The latest plan—to concentrate on cities and big FOBs—flies in the face of reason and even a basic understanding of the ground-level conditions. I am holding out hope that this 60-day review McChrystal has ordered will point out its folly… but I remain as unhopeful about it as ever before. The military just demonstrates zero desire for learning from its own recent history.
Previously:
Attacks in Khost Highlight Need for New Strategy
Kapisa Province: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency
Provinces Like Khost Need More Than Just Troops
Dispatches from FOBistan: the Garrison Problem
Afghanistan’s Police in Action
The Failure of Good Intentions
…and much, much, much more…
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Have these guys not read ANY history?!?! I mean…WOW!!! The insurgents don’t really win untill they controll the cities, true. HOWEVER, the counter-insurgents never really win untill they hold the countryside! Case in point: China between 1945 and 1949. In four short years, the Communists drove the superior forces of the Nationalists off the mainland because the Nationalist forces refused to make the effort to hold the countryside. Insurgents don’t hang out in cities for the same reason that counter insurgents like them. They are easy to control. All the people are clustered together so one spy or cop and watch a multitude of people. The countryside, with all of its open space and distance between people, makes watching the inhabitants that much harder.
As for the FOBs…That is one of the biggest issues we have here. We all feel so nice and safe on our warm little FOBs with our XBOX, internet, and big tall walls, that no one actually wants to go out and do anything. Then of course, in some cases, the soldiers (or Marines) actually DO want to go out, and they are denied by commanders who are more interested in going home and telling everyone how the “Never lost a man” in Afghanistan. Never mind that they didn’t actually accomplish anything either. After all, you can lose and entire village to the Taliban with no real negative effects on your career, but if you lose a man defending that village…Court Martial investigation…
If I were to pick one thing to change in this “war” to really make a difference, it would be that the soldiers were outside the wire daily with the ANSF, to include night patrolls throgh all the bad neighborhoods they shy away from now. If I got a second choice, it would be to find the locals jobs. A lot of people are fighting because it pays well…
This brings me back to the question of “what is victory in Afghanistan?” I’m not sure the marginal cost of new strategies, leaders, troops, etc. is less than the marginal benefit.
Unrelated to this post, but related to other posts, did you happen to see Gretchen Peters on PBS NewsHour the other night discussing her new book on the heroin trade and the insurgency?
Interesting comments on how the U.S. isn’t following the money to officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan who are getting rich off the trade when the profits go to help kill U.S. soldiers. How the heck do we expect to win this war when we turn a blind eye to this stuff, doing dumb stuff like confiscating illegally cut lumber (per one of your previous posts)?
That may be your best post ever.
I hope it is widely read.
You’ve said it before, and you’re saying it again, and you continue to be bang on.
Wonder if they’re doing it because it’s easier and won’t need as many troops? Even if it doesn’t give the best results? Ya think?
Another good story on PBS tonight about how Afghan children on the border have to cross over to Pakistan to illegally smuggle flour back. It was in a region where poppies were successfully eliminated through gov’t programs, while other promises of aid weren’t kept. It was an example of a tired rural area trying not to starve (you can comment on the accuracy of the report) and angry at American promises.
Pakistan has banned wheat exports to Afghanistan, hence the smuggling. Can we even hope to win hearts & minds when Pakistan says “screw you” to the Afghans like that?
To (briefly) defend Pakistan, they are facing serious stress on their own food supply right now. So it might not just be a big middle finger for Afghanistan. But the broader point, which is that in many regions in the east “successful” counternarcotics has simply crashed the local economy, is right on, and something I’ve railed against for years.
Fritz, it’s not the Coalition that likes to stay in at night… if they could they’d do everything at night when it’s much safer for us, and stay under cover in the day. But it’s IMPOSSIBLE to get the ANSF to work at night. They will. Not. Do. It. Every ETT and OMLT and PMT in the country says the same thing. And without them, a bunch of Westerners wandering around at night can’t ever really accomplish a whole hell of a lot.
Getting the ANSF to leave their fortified locations in the daytime more than once every couple days is hard enough. Yeah, they’ve learned some of that from us: they are increasingly modelling our risk-averse, fobbit ways, especially the ANA. But it’s also a widely-held ANSF mindset that sees the war as something to be survived, rather than won.
This is also why the ANA is so behind this whole “re-occupy the cities” thing. They figure it’s fewer casualties, and more free time for them between patrols. Which, frankly, it will be.
Oh, JFTR, I never heard of a Cdn OMLT being held on base and out of an ANSF firefight in progress: that’s a new one. I have heard of other units being slow to reinforce/assist, or requests for fire support being turned down or delayed until it was too late, though. That seems to happen a fair bit. YMMV.
You see it everywhere—right down to the frustrations of ETTs being held on their base because they can’t get permission to go assist their Afghan brethren in a firefight (which also happens with depressing regularity).
Absolutely spot on. In fact, I know of two embedded trainers who were threatened with disciplinary actions for leaving the FOB to assist in a firefight before the dim-witted American Army Engineers could get their act together and go running to the fight.
BruceR:
Fritz, it’s not the Coalition that likes to stay in at night… if they could they’d do everything at night when it’s much safer for us, and stay under cover in the day.
That may be the case where you were at, but I know in good ol’ NK2L there was a standing order to do nothing at night.
As a former PMT in RC-E / Khost, I have to agree with the comments that there were restrictions limiting US Forces to the bases or from operations at night. I experienced both of these situations while working with the coalition forces there at the time. Contrary to the other s here, I observed that the ANSF were more than willing to operate at night and importantly in any terrain. The coalition forces at the time were restricted by risk adverse leadership, war weary soldiers, many on third or fourth combat tours and sick of loosing buddies. The “Force Protection” (FP) requirements placed on US forces made every patrol that did go out, a Platoon or more often larger operation, usually named after some ridiculous American football metaphor that our Afghan partners who were “In Charge” could not appreciate. Initially exempt from these FP rules, I was able to support the ANP throughout the extremely austere and remote areas and at all hours -day or night. Fully knowing the dangers, the ANP leaders mitigated the risk by providing only small footprint, and most importantly maximizing local intelligence. All this stopped once the PMT mission matured and my team came under ISAF control and their increased FP rules. After that the PMT could barley leave the FOB unless it was part of a large and cumbersome, often undisciplined parade of US firepower. Ironically this “Smile Knock” activity in the name of COIN only instilled fear in the locals that no amount of Civil Affairs or Reconstruction Effort could undo. As far as the urban vs. rural aspect of the fight in Afghanistan went, the same FP Rules at the time required operations have mutual supporting fires of your vehicle mounted crew serve weapons. This restricted operations to areas in and around the roads and eliminated most of the area that the Taliban actually operated in. This lack of engagement with the enemy provided an illusion of success for the local commander because the resulting drop in enemy contact due to a limited or no patrolling was portrayed as a reduction of enemy activity and increase in the “Security and Stability of Khost” bullet to put on his OER. It reminded me of the saying “if a tree falls in the woods and no one is there to hear it does it still make a noise!” It does make noise! The follow on forces found out exactly how loud when they had the balls to impose themselves on the enemy’s freedom of maneuver in the mountains of Spera District! These risk adverse, bunker mentality tactics cannot defeat an enemy perfectly at home in the mountains, comfortable with the adversity of living under the stars surviving by eating only pine nuts and occasional goat meat. If the majority of forces are restricted to relatively Taliban free urban areas and the rural areas that can only be accessed by clumsy armored vehicles or worse stuck on the FOB we will lose ground in this enemy oriented fight!
Absolutely, DanO… the problem is that the “oil spot” concept has worked as well as it will in Kabul, J-bad, etc… it’s time to start spreading out, and has been, but more reconstruction resources need to be allocated to the more rural areas (and I’m not talking about PRTs… those idiotic things need to be abolished) along with commanders and troops who aren’t afraid to live outside of the FOB for weeks on end.