Though I have never disagreed with the argument that the Taliban must be driven back, and their advance must be dealt with swiftly and decisively, I have disagreed—for several years now—with much of the scaremongering over the issue in the West. There were many reasons for this, both geographical, cultural, and even religious, but the fundamental point is: while the Pakistani Taliban certainly matter a great deal—especially to the U.S. troops in Eastern Afghanistan—the problem is neither as dire as most have predicted nor as simple as “drive them out.” It’s much worse.

The Islamabad skyline, a Pakistan few American media will ever show.
Pakistan is, at its heart, a country of striking contrasts. Islamabad is a modern, planned city barely five decades old; Lahore is prosperous and fairly liberal; Karachi is a teeming buzz of activity. There are the incredibly wealthy, who live in absolute luxury, and a smaller but burgeoning middle class. There are also tremendous hordes of the desperately poor. While Islamabad is a very prosperous city, the tribal areas where the Taliban came from are not. While poverty is not at all a constant indicator of militancy, it does make militancy more likely in many areas—the vast majority of the militants in the area are poor, desperate, and have few if any other options.
Even then, it would be silly to write off the Pashtuns as entirely up in arms against the government. For years, many of the communities in the FATA, and now many of the communities in the NWFP, have been trying to raise their own local militias to resist the advances of the Taliban, even when the government denies them protection.
This stark contrast came home in an excellent piece in the CS Monitor:
The elite area [of Islamabad] features a commercial center with a movie theater showing, at the moment, “Fast & Furious IV,” as well as a big-box store and a McDonald’s. Sitting on a bench, a young Pakistani businessman dressed in jeans laughs at the question of a Taliban takeover. “No,” says Omar Ali with incredulity. “Do you think the Taliban are going to take over Washington?”
If it sounds as if Mr. Ali lives in a world far removed from the Taliban, it’s because he does, literally and figuratively. The drive from McDonald’s to the mountain hamlets of Buner, where the Taliban are trying to gain a sandal hold, takes about four hours. It may be 60 miles as the drone flies, but it’s double that by pickup truck.
The M1 Motorway heading out of the capital starts like an American Interstate highway – three divided lanes in each direction, manicured on and off ramps. Take an exit toward Buner and soon the pavement grows intermittent, as does the sight of any women in public view.
There is more there, and it is definitely worth reading in its entirety. For many Pakistanis, the worry about the Taliban did not begin until they got close to their city—until there was a slight danger of some of the fighting happening nearby. The Army mobilized. At the time, I speculated that there was a bit of an ethnic component to this, that most Pakistanis—Punjabis and Sindhis—felt the Pashtuns were kind of rednecks and didn’t care about them until their own areas were threatened. While that seems to have happened, it’s just a correlation… but a troubling one nevertheless.
The contrasts of Pakistan came out, too, in this curious report about a British tourist motorcyling his way from Nepal all the way back to the UK:
Adding that he finds it incomprehensible that in a relatively intellectually advanced nation like Pakistan, half the population is denied social freedom that the other half so richly enjoys, he said, “I am sensibly cautious though about broadcasting any such sweeping or incendiary judgments, as three weeks in a country hardly qualifies me. I don’t see it as an Asian issue for women are to be seen everywhere in neighbouring countries, I therefore attribute it to religious tradition.” “My other main observation was how everybody I met, from businessmen in cities to shepherds in remote areas, was completely united in their utter contempt for the Taliban. They just want to get on with their lives and live in peace. They did not see the Taliban as Muslims, but rather as mercenaries… The genuine warmth and kindness, I have received from the people of Pakistan has dispelled any lingering myths promulgated by the Western media.”
That’s not to say his trip is not incredibly dangerous. It is—he was speaking to a reporter in Rawalpindi, and the most dangerous leg of his trip by far is just ahead, as he has to navigate either the Khyber or the Karakoram Highway to leave Pakistan to the west (or go south through the Registan Desert and Balochi territory, but even the 19th century British rarely did that save a few very brave souls). Even so, the contrast between the eastern half of Pakistan, which is by all descriptions fabulous, and the western half, which is wracked by conflict, is surely indicative of something: Pakistan is not a simple place, nor is it easily lent to broad, sweeping discussions of what it, or we, should do to help.
{ 6 comments }
I thought you were rather skeptical of the ethnic dimensions of the conflict?
Joshua,
I read your blog on a daily basis and find it to be one of the best sources of analysis on Afghanistan and Pakistan.
But when you say “its much worse,” what are you basing this on? Have you been to the actual parts of Af-Pak where the violence is taking place? If so, how much time have you spent there? And have you talked to people from groups that we are fighting, ie the Taliban and groups that are affiliated with them in Pakistan?
Mariam Abu Zehab, a French expert on Afghanistan and Pakistan, has spent extensive time in these regions and met with most of the leaders of these groups. Her conclusions about the situation in Af-Pak, outlined in this recent interview (below), differ from what you are saying.
http://islamyoon.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1239888988333&pagename=Islamyoun%2FIYALayout&ref=body
She doesn’t see the Taliban in the terms that you do. She also seems to suggest that it is the US presence that is the problem, not the solution. Ie the US presence is what is exacerbating recent violence.
Rob
Josh, I think you need to extend your point here.
It was precisely because Islamabad and Lahore are relatively prosperous and stable that it was so alarming when the violence spread into Punjab. (Superimpose the photos of the Marriott burning on your picture of Islamabad’s skyline and you get the point.) Also if you attack cricket in that part of the world (as happened with the attack on the Sri Lankan team) you are introducing a whole new element that was not there before.
So while I agree with you that Pakistan is far more complicated and richer culturally than it is often given credit for, would like to see your thoughts on how this fits into the situation in Punjab.
Do you think the offensive against the Taliban, and the new public mood against them, will have a major impact on (latent) support for militancy in Punjab?
Myra
Alex, skeptical I was, but I’ve come to believe there is probably an ethnic component to elite Pakistani’s reactions to the Taliban.
Rob, when I said it’s “much worse,” I was referring to the discussion of Pakistan’s cultural and social complexity. Even with the Pashtun areas, it’s not a black and white thing — ESPECIALLY considering how many Taliban are not actually foreign to the area. As for Ms. Zehab, she’s right that the groups there complain about the U.S. presence in the area. It’s much easier than complaining that their stated goal, establishing an Islamist state, also happens to require removing the Pakistani government, in addition to the U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
Like I said, it’s much more complex than “U.S. = bad,” even if the U.S. having a terrible reputation is a major issue. But it is only one of the many issues driving the militancy. I should have expanded on that more.
Myra, I agree to a certain extent, that the militancy reaching formerly safe areas is a cause for concern. But again, I’d say it’s much more complex than that. There has been militancy in the Punjab and in Sindh for many years, well before the U.S. ever was an issue. In the 1990s, it was focused around the mujahirs and the Shias… it just found a different focus.
Again, the point I’m arguing here, which doesn’t quite fit nicely into a short-ish blog post, is that there is tremendous complexity to the militancy that simply is not a part of the narrative—including that it’s only a problem when there are bombs in Lahore.
And I do think the offensive will have an impact, in a positive direction. The militants badly overstretched themselves, and I really hope that the momentum continues. I think the Pakistani government got sick and tired of their activities, and there seems far less patience in the Pakistan’s public consciousness for the militancy as well. It’s not longer seen as just a Pashtun problem, so there is much more support for addressing it head on.
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 06/09/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.
Joshua,
Actually Ms Zehab does take up the issue of their “stated goal” and dismisses it as rhetoric said by a few, that noone should take seriously since they have no material capability of achieving that goal.
Secondly, where is the Afghani Taliban’s stated goal to take over Pakistan? The leader of the Political Committee gave an interview on Al-Jazeera a few weeks ago, and not once did he mention anything about trying to take over Pakistan.
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