A Problem More Serious Than Bias
Dave Dilegge, the Grand Poobah behind the Small Wars Journal, reacted with rather severe anger in a post highlighting the discrepancy between local and official U.S. versions of alleged civilian casualties during ISAF operations. A few days ago, I was noting the difference between the American insistence that a bombing incident in the village of Azizabad, in Shindand district of Herat province killed 30 Taliban militants and local claims that instead somewhere between 75 and 95 civilians died.
Dilegge accused me of rampant bias (presumably against the Coalition), as well as ignorance of ISAF ROE (rules of engagement, the terms of which dictate under what conditions munitions may be dropped from aircraft). Given previous accusations of mass civilian casualties during ISAF responses—including, most recently, the double-wedding bombings in Nanagarhar and Nuristan—turned out to be true despite repeated ISAF denials, I felt that skepticism of the U.S. version of events was warranted.
But who is really biased? Yesterday, SWJ mentioned the incident in their daily round-up of news, but this was noteworthy for its exclusive use of official U.S. military sources denying the significant presence of any civilians (one source admitted five might have been nearby, but since they were related to the militants who cares if they died).
Yet today, August 25, news has emerged about several independent investigations of the incident. The AP reports:
An Afghan human rights group that visited the site of the operation said Saturday that at least 78 people were killed in clashes and an airstrike. The Ministry of Interior has said 76 civilians died, including 50 children under the age of 15, though the Ministry of Defense said 25 militants and five civilians were killed.
Karzai said Sunday that at least 89 civilians were killed.
Karzai also fired two high-ranking Afghan National Army officers for their involvement in the Azizabad incident. But it’s even worse: the AFP reports that the Afghan cabinet has demanded the renegotiation of the agreements allowing ISAF and the U.S. to operate in the country. They’re seeking to end air strikes on civilians, illegal detentions, and “unilateral house searches,” though the definitions of all three terms are not clear (neither ISAF nor the U.S. have ever intentionally targeted civilians, for example).
Regardless of the total fallout of the Azizabad incident, it is clear that the Afghan government itself is furious about the repeated deaths of civilians by the dozen in coalition air strikes—which would mean the terms under which air strikes are appropriate should probably change if the overall goal of the campaign in Afghanistan is “separating the enemy from the people.”
Mentioning that now several independent investigations have either confirmed or alleged the deaths of dozens of civilians in Shindand, as well as the sacking of two high-ranking ANA officers, should be necessary if one is to have a balanced, accurate gauge of what is really happening in Afghanistan. Yet none of this (save a single link to an NYT story about the sackings) made its way into SWJ’s August 25 news and op-ed roundup.
Which makes me wonder, Dave Dilegge, which one of us is more biased?
Stumble it! |
Tags: Afghanistan, Propagandists.
Posted by Joshua Foust on August 25th, 2008
Permalink | Trackback | Comments: 10
Comments
Time: 8/25/2008, 11:21 am
Foust, excuse me for dumping into your fight, but an answer to Dumass on the importance of Dilegges reply: You see, Dilegge and the lads over at SWJ are the folks who are at the core of the process of turning the US military machine into the era of FM 3-24 and COIN. They are the ones who are supposed to be pro hearts and minds, and anti-stupidity such as flat out denial of on-the-ground facts. They are supposed to have learned from the stupid shit our brave alliance has been up to these last years in the Afghan, and to build on the smart shit that has been done. So to see one of these folks support a IO tactic (wich as you not is a part of a pattern) that is dumb as shit and a proven nowinner is … confusing.
Where is the airborne blood-debt patrol, flying in with presents and goats to the survivors (Patronizing, I know)? Where is the official apology, or god forbid, the firing of someone responsible on primetime afghan television? Nowhere. And this comes down to one of the most puzzling facts about the US armed forces: They never, ever ever make mistakes in real time. And so the story goes, and one stupid screwup tears down 1 year of PRT work because of macho bullshit and stupid folks with mental crewcuts running the show. Argh. The point about the SWJ folks is, they should know better.
Time: 8/25/2008, 11:24 am
Well, but that’s the point. One arbiter of high-end military theorizing and analysis is accusing me of bias and ignorance over this, while I don’t think skepticism is an unreasonable response, especially when the military’s first response tends to be wrong. That’s it.
Time: 8/25/2008, 11:30 am
Yes, what fnord said. I will say this, as well: my respect for Karzai has increased tremendously now that he’s fired some of the Afghans involved. He is showing more independence and authority over his military than the U.S. president (who weakly mouths that he’ll cede all strategic and political thinking on the war over to his generals—surely not in the spirit of a civilian-controlled military, but whatever).
Time: 8/25/2008, 1:33 pm
Well, Karzai ought to get serious, since, he’s probably a lot “easier to get to” for the relatives of the people who got killed in air strikes. He can’t just “speak in tongues,” i.e. some mumbo jumbo about ROE etc. and expect them not to care.
But….here in the ‘States, why should anybody care considering it’s all very far away and very foreign? For us, it’s good enough that our ppl mean well (and I don’t doubt they do), regardless of the consequences.
Time: 8/25/2008, 7:24 pm
I’m quite sure that ANA officers had very little to nothing to do with these civilian casualties. One of them was just viewed as closer to US forces than to the Afghan ministry of war-making.
When Afghan governors/local leaders or officers are fired after civilian casualties (whether for being accused of some level of responsibility or complaining about them independently) there is a very good possibility that they are being fired for something else entirely. For example, does anyone think that Governor Nuristani was really fired for complaining about civilian casualties? If that was the case the you would have to fire half the governors in afghanistan.
It’s a bit like those people getting fired for corruption. Immediately every one wonders what the real reason is.
Time: 8/25/2008, 7:37 pm
Fnord is right re the importance of Dilegge’s reply, I was wondering more how Dilegge could argue against JF’s position given the track record on the ground…
Time: 8/31/2008, 11:31 pm
The wedding parties attacked were in Dih Bala District, Nangarhar and Mitharlam District, Laghman Province. The recent incident in Nuristan was a missile strike on a bus filled with people told to leave an area by NATO to escape a pending operation. They did as they were told and died for it.
Time: 9/2/2008, 7:27 pm
It seems to me that you’re doing an excellent, less biased job, Joshua.
But I also have a LOT of sympathy for the military — wars can not really be fought without killing civilians, when at least one group of fighters is intermingling with civilians.
I think this basic denial issue is an even bigger problem than the denial of particulars. I think you’d agree that more civilians are deliberately targeted by the Taliban terrorists. But holding the anti-terrorists to a 0 civilian kill standard means almost no effective response. It’s just not politically possible to acknowledge that fighting terrorists will inevitably kill non-combatants.
Time: 9/2/2008, 8:02 pm
Tom,
I agree, 100%. The problem here is not the tragedy of innocent people being caught in the middle. That happens, and I genuinely believe the military does try to minimize casualties within its current tactical set. I have argued before that other tactics, while potentially more risky to Coalition personnel, would even more greatly reduce the civilian casualty count, which would make the IO game much easier. That, however, is a separate issue.
The problem here is not one of intent, but of expectations management. In short, the military does a miserable job of responding to complaints, allegations of misconduct, and charges of negligence. They can do better, and must, if they’re to come out on top.
Time: 8/25/2008, 11:03 am
I’m not sure what the issue/discussion is about. Go back and look at all the cases where it turned out that mistakes were made and civilians were hit (in Afghanistan and/or Iraq…) IN EVERY case that I’ve seen the first reaction is to 1. claim only militants/insurgents were hit; then 2. pooh pooh the claims of civilian casualties (’ a marriage party out in the middle of the desert?’, ‘misinformation spread by the Taliban’, etc.); 3. repeat steps 1 and 2; then 4. in the face of overwhelming evidence, agree that there may have been civilian casualties; 5. open an investigation; 6. say that we don’t want to discuss pending the results of the investigation… Later, much much later, an admission of (unspecified, general) error may be made, payoffs occur, and even somtimes denials take place after the admission and payoff.
There’s more than enough to make a pattern, so that it becomes difficult to ever believe the first response/story. An example:
http://ph2dot1.blogspot.com/2008/06/reflex.html