The Militant Idiocy of Thomas Barnett
For some reason, people continue to solicit, enjoy, and buy into the opinions of Thomas Barnett. I find this curious because in almost every situation in which his theories can be tested, they fail—most recently, in Georgia, where Barnett’s advocacy of replicating the Balkans everywhere there is conflict doesn’t bode well for a sustainable security policy. Regardless, and for reasons I honestly don’t understand, really smart guys like Zenpundit keep drinking Barnett’s kool-aid™:
Dr. Barnett puts the costs of playing the Russo-Georgian War ( and/or demonizing China. Some out there would like to do both!) in an unthinkingly “feel good” way as throwing away most of our gains from winning the Cold War…The new states of the “near abroad” like Georgia are vulnerable to Russian meddling not because they are militarily weak but because their populations are disunited and their governments operate with dubious legitimacy, excess opacity and a systemic mafiya corruption that saps their national vitality. To stand strong, they need to clean up their acts in their own best interests so the help we extend can be effectively used.
I left a comment on Zenpundit’s post, the gist of which is that those things he defines as making Georgia a weak state also make Russia incredibly weak, far weaker than we’ve been willing to admit the last few weeks. And that Georgia is far less of each of those than is Russia. Let’s be serious here, people, because there really is no mystery: Russia has a better military. That’s why they won.
But that bit about the core, what about that? Is Russia really a “core” state, and is Georgia really a “gap” state? tdaxp examined Barnett’s writings over the past five years on what exactly the terms mean, and comes up empty:
If “Core” / “Gap” is merely some self-selected conflict space, where we refuse to be maneuvered into conflict, then we can shrink it by merely avoiding conflict when it presents itself. By this definition India has no Gap except Kashmir, because the Indian government just ignores insurgencies elsewhere.
If the likelihood of military conflict is a function of economic connectedness, global rulesets, etc, then likelihood of being a theater of armed conflict is a good description of the Core/Gap divide.
Georgia and Ukraine are connecting. They are new democracies. They are both in the WTO. They have been talks with the European Union and NATO, and hopefully more will come of this in the future. Paying attention to the direction of connectivity, Georgia and Ukraine are on their way “up” to the core.
Russia is disconnecting. It is a new dictatorship. Russia is not even close to being in the WTO. It has suspended its cooperation with NATO. Paying attention to the degree on connectivity, Russia is on its way “down” to the gap.
Exactly. Not only can Barnett not agree on a single definition for his terms, he doesn’t seem to understand them when he settles on one for the convenience of current events. By his definition, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Iran should also be “core” states, while Bulgaria and Romania should be “gap” states. Ditto for Turkey.
So, can anyone explain why or how Barnett is providing a useful framework for insipid Grand Strategy that is in any way more applicable to the world than Tom Friedman’s stupid McDonald’s Theory of Big Macs Stop War? Because reality keeps showing how empty and useless they really are.
Meanwhile, Barnett’s Non-Integrating Gap Georgia must now contemplate exactly how Russia’s invasion will shatter it’s growing success story. Ras al-Khaimah’s $100m plan to turn Poti into the “Dubai of the Black Sea” is almost certainly off the table, as is future investment from Kazakhstan. And it is unclear how Georgia’s rather stunning advances in economic reform and anti-corruption will fare with Russian troops trampling all over Gori.
But I mean, Thomas Barnett said Georgia was a Gap nation. So none of that matters anyway while Russia imposes its New Core rule set, right?
Right.
Stumble it! |
Tags: Georgia, Russia.
Posted by Joshua Foust on August 22nd, 2008
Permalink | Trackback | Comments: 12
Comments
Time: 8/22/2008, 8:22 pm
Despite my friendship for Mark Safranski (Zenpundit) I’ve never shared his enthusiasm for Dr. Barnett. I’ve written critically of his Core/Gap notion on a number of occasions. Among the problems I see: it’s not quantified, it’s not predictive. Frankly, I think the old spheres of influence model is far, far better for explaining the state of the world as it is.
Time: 8/22/2008, 8:38 pm
I agree. I have nothing personal against Safranski — as I said, he is really really smart otherwise — but I just don’t get the Barnett thing.
Spheres of Influence is one framework that could work (it certainly fits the with-us-or-against-us strain in US foreign policy). Realpolitik is also useful, though with an obviously expanded definition of what constitutes interests. There are others I really don’t feel like thinking about on a Friday evening, as well, but the point is, many other theories far better explain the behavior of nations and offer substantive paths for future policies. Yet Barnett has the thriving book/lecture career.
As I said above: I just don’t get it.
Time: 8/22/2008, 9:12 pm
Josh: ‘Spheres of Influence is one framework that could work (it certainly fits the with-us-or-against-us strain in US foreign policy). Realpolitik is also useful, though with an obviously expanded definition of what constitutes interests. There are others I really don’t feel like thinking about on a Friday evening, as well, but the point is, many other theories far better explain the behavior of nations and offer substantive paths for future policies. Yet Barnett has the thriving book/lecture career.’
I think what we’ve seen in the coverage of the South Ossetia crisis is a revival of classical Realist theories about states’ behaviour in the realm of international relations. Dusting-off their copies of Thucydides, Hobbes, Morgenthau et al, the Realists portrayed Russia as the strong state and Georgia as the weak state, with the former acting as Butch to the latter’s Mary.
The problem as I see it is that if self-interest is the prime motive in Realist theory, then what was the benefit for Russia? some have suggested that just as fear of increasing Athenian power was what worried Sparta and hence triggered the Pelopponesian war, so NATO’s march Eastwards was the final straw for Russia.
Fear is often cited - by both Thucydides and, in so many words, Hobbes - as one of the three main causes - along with honor and profit - of bellicose behaviour by individuals and states. However, just putting Russia’ s actions down to plain old fear seem a little trite. However, there was - thus far, anyway - very little honor (or face-saving) in Russia’s actions and even less profit. based on these conclusions, classical Realism seems a poor framework for interpreting Russia’s actions in South Ossetia …
… then again, a Realist framework might better be applied to Russia’s foreign policy elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, most particularly in the realm of hydrocarbons where Russian policies have been spectacularly profitable.
Liberal theorists of IR have nothing worthwhile contributing to the debate as the international community, or regional organisations such as NATO, were rendered irrelevant by events.
In the end, perhaps the wacky Constructivists have the answer, as IMHO the biggest factor was the issue of leadership and the inability of Putin and Saakashvili to maintain an even vaguely civil relationship. An examination of rhetoric by Russian and Georgian leadership on South Ossetia would probably suggest that in the end there was a complete breakdown in relations and Russia took advantage.
It’s Friday night. I’ll get me coat.
Time: 8/22/2008, 9:19 pm
Nick, I just put up a post wondering about what Russia is gaining through its current behavior. Frankly, I don’t really get it, unless they’ve decided that the benefits of forcing a Russia-favorable outcome on the separatists outweigh any costs they feel the international community can force upon them.
And I don’t find constructivism wacky per se, just over-wrought and generally not worth the trouble. Maybe it really is worth the trouble, despite the violence they do to the virtues of brevity.
Time: 8/22/2008, 9:30 pm
I just put up a post wondering about what Russia is gaining through its current behavior.
I can’t help but suspect that it’s mostly domestic politics.
Time: 8/22/2008, 9:30 pm
The problem is that however unreasonable Russia’s actions appear to the outside world, somewhere in Moscow impeccable logic and rationale was applied to the situation and subsequent actions appeared justified.
In the end, there is still stuff we fundamentally just don’t understand about states’ behaviour in international relations. You might call it akin to finncial analysts notions of “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns”.
It’s easy to condemn Russia’s actions (and some of Georgia’s) as any sane person should - but it’s another thing entirely to explain them. I tend to go with William Goldman’s assessment of the film industry: nobody knows anyhting. By which he meant that for all the millions of dollars spent producing and promoting a film, nobody could really tell whether or not it would be a hit.
Likewise, the problem with Realism (as Carr noted) is that it is absolutely no help in explaining events which don’t conform to its own parameters - as I noted above. Theories derived from Neorealism face similar problems (I don’t known much about Core/Gap - is it a Structuralist or Neorealist theory). Anyway … it’s too early to tell.
Time: 8/22/2008, 9:38 pm
Dave, I’ll avoid the cheeky explanation that everything is always domestic politics (all politics is global, etc.), but I think that is a good starting point considering the strong support voiced by many Russians inside and outside of Russia.
Time: 8/22/2008, 10:58 pm
Mark Safranski is a complete idiot, encrypting simpleton posts and parasite to faddish ideas. Why even read his blog?
Time: 8/23/2008, 10:38 am
Hey - don’t know if you know this already, but the site doesn’t show up properly in firefox 3 (the header image doesn’t show which kind of screws up some other stuff).
Time: 8/23/2008, 4:11 pm
In fairness to Tom, he offers a guide for those who want to quantify and operationalize his theory, on pages 161-165 of his first book. I took a step towards doing so, [1] and found that he generally hit the mark.
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/05/08/redefining-the-gap-1-prologue.html
Time: 8/23/2008, 4:20 pm
Barnett is fine for defining the world according to a very limited set of criteria. But he ripped off Wallerstein’s World System Theory to do it in any case, and I instinctively mistrust neo-Marxist frameworks without empirical evidence. This current war, to me, demonstrates that Barnett’s theories and inapplicable to the real world. There is no reason to assume he is adding anything new to Wallerstein’s old Core-Semiperiphery-Periphery framework, with the idea that the world is economically deterministic. Which is just batty, because countries act against their own economic interests all the time.
Time: 8/24/2008, 3:53 pm
The question of *why* Georgia might very well lie in the area of black economy. Esp. S. Ossetis has been a veritable thieves market these last ten years, and the Georgian mafya has been (much like the Chechnyan used to be) one of the old criminal structures of the russian crimescene. There was a oligarch who got murdered just before the attack on S. Ossetia as well. This is, of course, pure conjecture, but its fascinating how little the black economy of the world seems to have an impact in intelectual circles of grand theory.
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