Being Right Doesn’t Always Feel Good
For years, I have been angrily arguing that U.S. negligence of events in Afghanistan would catastrophically undo the small bits of progress we’ve seen there. It was why I’ve mocked Ann Marlowe (repeatedly) for declaring the military’s job well done in the east: it simply is not true. The centerpiece of her propaganda about the war’s success has centered in Khost province, where a single LTC descended from the notorious American Civil War General Custer was feeding her stories about how things are great and the military is the best thing ever to win the peace.
Of course, in the few short months since that piece came out, Khost has turned unspeakably dangerous, netting the first fatality of the Army’s Human Terrain System, a respected political scientists with years of experiene in the country named Michael Bhatia, along with dozens of Army soldiers and officers. It takes the willfully blind to look at Khost and see success, and while those who have staked their reputations on saying it is have been vicious in arguing so, it is incredibly important to take a sober look at the facts and see it for what it is: an impending failure.
Yet reading about the massive, coordinate assault on FOB Salerno in Khost is not in any way satisfying. Friends of mine are and have been stationed there. This kind of news means every single U.S. serviceman (and NATO for that matter, now that 10 French soldiers were killed just to the north) is in an incredible amount of danger—vastly more danger than at any time in Iraq—and this danger is concentrated in the ignored East of the country while all of the attention continues to focus on the South.
So please, right-leaning blogosphere: please stop all the victory-mongering. The Pentagon is failing us by not treating the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan as an emergency worth of its attention. Sending—what, three or four brigades?—is a start. But the current numbers of troops we have there barely know what to do. We need a top-down revision of strategy and tactics, and without that (which would involve the painful process of some flag officers actually having to admit failure) this will simply be more fuel to the fire.
Stumble it! |
Tags: Afghanistan, Military Affairs.
Posted by Joshua Foust on August 20th, 2008
Permalink | Trackback | Comments: 7
Comments
Time: 8/20/2008, 4:51 pm
It’s a lot easier to simply take the negative position in an argument, as you typically do, critiquing various policies. You’ll get more points when you articulate a comprehensive plan — of course, maybe I missed it. It has to be more than just “no more roads” and “Ann Marlowe is wrong.” You’ve won all that stuff.
Time: 8/20/2008, 5:05 pm
Admiral, I agree. I’m not just those things. I’ve written before that the Army should be promoting its real victories, such as the incredible growth of Afghanistan’s telecommunications network, or the legitimate achievement in holding violence in RC-East only to a 36% increase over last year, while many other provinces saw far worse increases in violence.
Digging back further, I’ve also written of the criticality of an integrated approach, more closely tying security to groups pushing reconstruction (while keeping them separate), but also by channeling reconstruction through the government to shore up its legitimacy (the community development councils are a great first step in this regard).
Similarly, I’ve been adamant in my belief that the ultimate solution to the “haven” problem in Pakistan is ultimately political, and not commando or strike based, as well as the desperate need for better cultural training for troops being deployed.
I’ve spent a lot of time criticizing the last few months for the very simple reason that for some reason, the military feels like bragging about the wrong things, while it seems they’re ignoring the very real problems underneath. That nags the hell out of me.
Time: 8/20/2008, 6:34 pm
For those of us who were on the ground — there is no question that in terms of lower violence, much more reconstruction thru the government, and pervasive tribal support — Khost was a incredible success last year.
Taliban/insurgents were not welcome except in Sebari and the remote Zadran areas of Southern Spera period. I could and did go to the far reaches of Khost and was not in fear of attack — with the exception of Sebari (where u.s. mil is in a blood feud with the tribe).
We constantly pointed out that it was fragile and easily reversed. For whatever the reason — you need to talk with those there now — all that ground was lost.
Offline I can send you e-mails from Afghans outlining what they think the cause is.
But it is interesting that your prescription is:
I’ve also written of the criticality of an integrated approach, more closely tying security to groups pushing reconstruction (while keeping them separate), but also by channeling reconstruction through the government to shore up its legitimacy (the community development councils are a great first step in this regard).
That — combined with permanent presence in the districts — was exactly the formula that brought stability to Khost last year.
Time: 8/20/2008, 11:26 pm
I have to differ with Big Dave unfourtunatly I dont remeber that name and I never saw him in Spera, Qualendar, and the other “Far reaches of Khost Province” in my work there during my year in 07.
The Commander of TF Professional was a motivated career orieneted officer and a great salesmen and promoter. His FA background his understanding of IO, and he stayed on message with the theme that Khost was safe.
I have to differ with Big Dave unfortunately I don’t remember that name and I never saw him in Spera, Qualendar, Jaji Maydan and the other “Far reaches of Khost Province” in my work during my year there in 07.
The Commander of TF Professional was a motivated, career , officer and a great salesmen and promoter. His FA background reinforced his deft use of IO, and he stayed on message with the theme that Khost was safe, suckering the likes of Ann Marlowe.
Labeling coordinated enemy attacks as “Demonstrations” and discounting enemy insurgent events as “Criminal Activity” are ways to spin the stats and support an OER based on a safer Khost. The city of Khost and the surrounding districts were reported to be safer but the CIED, TF Palladian may argue that with conflicting data as well.
I disagree that you could travel without fear of attack in Khost since the force protection measures were increased repeatedly by TF Pro resulting in large, cumbersome, and ineffective patrols that out gunned all but the dumbest or martyr crazed insurgent. This combined with the trendy decentralization of forces out to Afghan Police District Centers reduced overall mission capability
From my foxhole any success in Khost was negated by an element in Sabari holding ISAF’s attention while the real enemy exploited the unit seams in the West and North creating a movement corridor directly into adjacent units and more strategic targets in Kabul, Take a look at how those adjacent units suffered an increase in enemy attacks with an end run right by a Commander who in the end failed to work with his adjacent teammates and left the strategic quarterback alone and vulnerable in the backfield.
The reconstruction program in Khost was nested to support this effort resulting in projects being withheld and resources diverted to pet projects that the Afghans didn’t even want and actually created security problems.
I disagree with the assertion that the constant presence in the districts resulted in a safer Khost. In several violent instances occurred between security forces and ISAF (US). Building force protection buildings at the expense of the ANP facilities only drove a wedge between the elements and brought more enemy targeting US forces, to areas that had little activity prior to their moving in. Ironically the petitions from the Afghans asking ISAF to leave for their own safety fell on ears that only heard the OER supporting “Khost is Safer” themes and messages.
I lost some close Afghan and US friends in Khost last year and the recent attacks in Spera and Salerno prove to me that having a platoon of 20 something Paratroopers sequestered at a ANP district centers and their movement hamstrung with risk averse force protection requirements only improved their playstation skills and did nothing to improve the Afghan security forces and relations with the locals and arguably provide any real long term increase in security for Khost.
Time: 8/21/2008, 12:55 am
Dan, I don’t think it’s wrong to note that there were dangerous areas in Khost—there always have been—but I think the larger point Big Dave is getting at, and this is one that matches with my admittedly long-distance observations, is that Khost was better off last year than this year. I think on that point we can all agree, and that there had been some positive movement on the violence front. Remember when Colonel Schweitzer came out and bragged about a 60% reduction in violence in his AO? That AO included Khost.
That the situation has changed drastically probably shouldn’t be any great surprise. There was the usual spike of violence that happens during any RIPTOA as militants “test” out the new unit, plus it’s doubtless the usual division rivalries meant the 101st had to innovate its own methods to differentiate itself from the 82nd. This is not a unique attribute to anyone—it happens time and time again as divisions rotate into and out of theater.
Only in this case, it seems to have coincided with a spike in violence across RC-East. It is unfair to lay this entirely at the feet of the 101st, since this spike began before they were in-theater and in control. So there is a deeper, more fundamental driver of the violence than just a new unit—the only thing I can think of is that the grander strategic follies of war planning, which include decisions made at the CCDR level and above, have overwhelmed whatever local successes units were able to carve out in their AOs.
But I’m open to other viewpoints—clearly people in the same general area had vastly different experiences. And please feel free to email me your thoughts as well, if you don’t feel comfortable stating them in a comment thread (joshua -dot- foust -at- gmail - dot- com).
Time: 8/21/2008, 1:07 am
Dan,
You can have your opinion. I, of course, completely disagree. I am not saying it was all perfect but on balance it was very successful.
I don’t think it is useful to disparage each others work or reputations without acknowledging up front a real differences in views (and some personality conflicts) between HTT and the others … TF Pro/PRT/ETT/ODA.
My perspective from spending 320 days outside-the-wire in every district was exactly as I stated - Khost was safe (with the exception of Sebari) and that extensive Afghan-led reconstruction was making a huge difference.
It was presence, Afghan partnerships, and projects that were the drivers. Contrary to what you said, $52M of PRT projects were Afghan proposed, supported, and led. It was tough but we enforced real open bidding and limited corruption. We also worked IO very hard. In physical terms, five times more was done last year than in the previous six years (75 km of paved-road, 50 schools, 300 wells completed and much … much more).
But in the end, it was personal relationships with the tribes that made the most difference for my teams. If the tribes say NO to the enemy, it means NO. NO IEDs and no direct attacks. Of course, if they say NO to you - that applies too (Sebari). No operation will change that.
Suicide bombers are a different story. Hard to stop.
Now, we all lost friends in Sebari and that is a different story.
Dan, neither of us can prove any of this on a blog. You can say I wasn’t out there and I could say I never saw you (although I did on three occassions) but never in Qalander or Spera where you spent precious few days compared to us.
Not interested in going back and forth. I’ll let you have the final say.
In conclusion, please provide some balance in your statements and avoid disparaging those who spent 15 months — like yourself — trying to make the place better.
Time: 8/20/2008, 12:09 pm
Was this not why Gen Petraeus was nominated and confirmed as the next Commander of the US Central Command, to overhaul and or change the current existing strategy being employed in Afghanistan?