The fundamental, systemic, and deliberate misallocation of Afghanistan’s reconstruction continues to kill Americans, to say nothing of the many more Afghans who suffer from our lack of care. While we were busy invading Iraq, al Qaeda and the Taliban were busy setting up shop in Pakistan, where they now enjoy almost total freedom thanks to a broken government only now righting itself. Even the few American achievements, such as re-paving the Kabul—Kandahar highway, have now come to represent just how badly the West has failed to do anything positive for Afghanistan.
But today the highway is a dangerous gantlet of mines and attacks from insurgents and criminals, pocked with bomb craters and blown-up bridges. The governor of Ghazni Province came under fire driving through Salar on Tuesday and two of his guards were wounded, officials said.
The insurgents have made the route a main target, with the apparent aim of undercutting Afghanistan’s economy and infrastructure, said Gen. Zaher Azimi, the Afghan military spokesman.
The road has become the site of extreme carnage in the last six weeks, disrupting supply lines for American and NATO forces and tying down Afghan Army forces. One of the worst attacks occurred in Salar on June 24 when some 50 fuel tankers and food trucks carrying supplies for the United States military were ambushed.
Wait a minute, David “COIN” Kilcullen, I thought roads were the best way to connect people to their government and prevent IED attacks and ambushes? Here Carlotta Gall is using, you know, actual evidence to show otherwise. Odd. What do the Afghans in the Army and Police have to say?
Coordination with American forces in the area was so poor that a passing American military convoy had fired on his positions just five days before and wounded one of his soldiers, Muhammad Baqer, in both legs.
“I could easily have fired back at them,” he said angrily. Villagers, too, complained that the American troops were firing recklessly…
Nevertheless the Afghan Army units here seemed confident they could handle the insurgent threat in Wardak, and said the people were on their side.
“We can beat the Taliban conclusively when we build up our manpower,” said First Lt. Rahmatullah Minallah, who commands a post overlooking the Tangi valley, where the Americans died.
“I have 50 men here now. When I have 100 men, I can leave 50 here and go and clear out the village,” he said.
Well, at least they support the troops. If Rory Stewart and Bartle Breese Bull had their way, Minallah would be left at the mercy of a group of militants known for beheading and defiling dead bodies out of sheer spite.
This is just the latest example of how the consistent under-resourcing in security, badly planned development, and a general lack of care or attention has made Afghanistan the scene of absolutely horrific violence. And yet the best idea some people can come up with is… why bother sending more troops? The problem isn’t troops, it is training and coordination—just as the problem isn’t too much security presence, but rather too little. While sending troops cannot be used as a substitute for building up Afghan forces (and I have a sinking feeling that is just what the Obama-McCain Surge would do), they are an absolutely vital part of creating space (there’s that term again) for training and governance to work.
Previously:
An overview of the America-focused IO campaign to convince us roads have won us the counterinsurgency effort. Looking further at the worrying trend of dishonest, uncritical reporting from Afghanistan. The GAO finds little reliable data on the positive contribution of road construction. And the original critique of David Kilcullen’s baseless assertion of the security effect of road construction.
Comments on this entry are closed.