Registan.net

Seth Jones, the RAND fellow who’s currently writing an O’Hanlon number of op-eds on Afghanistan, recently wrote a defense of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai for Foreign Policy:

But for all of Karzai’s faults, there is nobody waiting in the wings. There are, of course, political rivals across Afghanistan, such as the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, who would love to see Karzai humbled in the presidential elections. A range of more serious candidates also appears to be considering running, including former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a competent technocrat who lacks significant popular support.

In other words, Karzai is still the best game in town. Not only is he superior to any plausible alternative, but he is a Pashtun, retains broad multiethnic support, and is Afghanistan’s most popular leader. In a December 2007 poll commissioned by ABC News, the BBC, and the German broadcasting consortium ARD, two thirds of Afghans rated Karzai’s performance as “excellent” or “good.” That’s why the United States and other NATO countries should stop undermining Karzai now, shore up support for him as the democratically elected president of Afghanistan, and help him show progress. Ultimately, that means supporting free and fair elections and letting Afghans choose their next president. But, right now, Karzai needs urgent help on several fronts.

It’s funny, because the rest of the column is spent defending Karzai’s obvious links to corrupt officials, and his own role in marginalizing liberal or critical politicians (along with the appropriate point about the absolute necessity of a good police force). For example, a popular leader with broad multiethnic support wouldn’t feel the need to ban popular parties and politicians, for example, nor would he openly fear the revolt of hundreds of thousands of Hazaras convinced he supports the Taliban because he refused to protect them from a violent dispute with Kuchi nomads. Similarly, one of the primary reasons Karzai doesn’t face more opposition from the Tajiks is because the vast majority of the Kabul technocracy is Tajik; that does not, however, mean he is popular or loved.

I’m curious about that poll. The Asia Foundation 2007 survey (pdf), for example, was far less optimistic about the government:

* Seventy-nine percent of the people felt that the government did not care what people thought while another 69 percent felt it was not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public.

* Eighty percent felt the government was doing a good job, but most of the credit in this regard went to the education and health sectors, while the government was seen to be performing below par in employment generation, economic revival and fighting corruption.

* Perception of the prevalence of corruption was higher at the national level (74%) than at the provincial (60%) or local levels (48%).

Needless to say, overall attitudes within the country seem pretty upbeat, which is good to hear. We are mistaken, however, in placing all of our eggs in the Karzai basket. In fact, Jones’ argument is emblematic of conventional thinking in Washington, which holds that no matter how counterproductive a leader is, if he’s at least marginally successful, he should be supported—even if that means supporting his deliberate suppression of free media, free speech, or free elections.

If our goal is ever to be a free and democratic Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai must be allowed to fall.

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