David Tate, a videojournalist who sometimes writes for the Long War Journal, certainly thinks so:
By the time Qourbon and an uncle made it back to Want, in the late afternoon of July 11, the village of around 50 homes was nearly empty. Most of the women and children had already been sent to nearby villages for safety. Qourbon’s father sent his siblings to be with another uncle while he remained behind to guard the family’s home.
“This was a clear message that US troops were going to be attacked by the militants,” thought Qourbon.
Want is a small village that houses two distinct extended families: Wanji and Wanjva. The bazaar, which provides for several other outlying villages, is usually open and bustling. The dozen or so shops providing everything the villagers need to survive. The two hotels in town rarely get overnight guests but they do get regular diners as they serve up local food. The town is rounded out with a mosque and a district center where government security forces have headquartered their security operation.
That is the description on a normal day in Want, which was not the case on July 11th. For several days, word on the streets was that a large force of militants were massing nearby with the intent of overrunning a US position that was in the process of being set up.
His informant Qourbon apparently tried repeatedly warning the U.S. base that it would soon come under massive attack, and the unit’s commander, Captain Matt Myers, said the Americans knew of an imminent attack. While it is unsurprising to hear that they had at least a partially working intelligence operation nearby, one wonders why they didn’t seem to get the magnitude of the assault, and why they didn’t connect the empty village with a large number of nearby militants (in the south, this is an obvious indication the insurgents are planning action). It could be that an assault of this size has simply never happened before.
Tate is upfront about the source of this information—an email exchange with an anonymous local. While it is understandable he wishes to keep his informant secret (and I don’t wish to cast aspersions on his account), I do have to wonder: just how real is this? Captain Myers seemed too non-chalant about the threat, especially if he was part of the 173rd, which has seen especially tough combat in the area. You’d think he’d take the threat more seriously.
That video he posts is also troublesome. Tate claims it is from the medevac that day, but the actual Youtube link indicates it was filmed last November. But that could just be a goof as well—we all have them.
Most interesting, however, was this snippet:
“I know the villages and people there. Most of them have shops and have a better life than others. I would say they suffered a lot in the fighting. US forces may think that the villagers support them (the militants) but that is not true.”
What is true, according to Qourbon, is that a US air attack on July 4 did contribute to local animosity and could have been why some of his fellow villagers did support the attack.
“(The attack) opened a way among the people for the militants to preach against US forces.”
According to an American press release, the air strike followed a mortar attack on US forces. The Americans claim that the two trucks they destroyed were trailed from the scene of that attack. The Afghans say the two trucks were filled with not only civilians, but civilians that had very good relations with the Americans.
One of the men killed (along with his wife, son and two grandchildren) was a man named Sonkara. Qourbon says that Sonkara is the one who gave up land so that US forces could build the outpost called Bella (the Afghans call the area “Bayla”).
Another man killed in the group was called Namatullah. Namatullah spoke good English and worked as a doctor in the Afghan clinic next to the US base at Bella. A second doctor and two other clinic workers also died. In all 17 Afghans were confirmed killed that day.
“That action really had a negative effect on the people,” said Qourbon. “The village elders asked the Americans not to come and they came anyway.”
This matches closely with my own research into the topic. Which does lend further credence to the account (I am inclined to believe it). Especially seeing as to how the tempo of air strikes is increasing greatly, it is vital the U.S. wrap its head around the very simple fact that air strikes have dire consequences.
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The information presented by Tate which is discussed here is not inaccurate based on other reliable sources.
Whatever the sentiments of the locals in Want, they have few options to resist or even expose fighters who seek to use their buildings to launch an attack on the Coalition.
The government and the Coalition are not able to protect them. And even if physical security could conceivably be provided at Want proper, the people living there have relatives elsewhere who would be potential targets for insurgent retaliation.
What has not been reported in detail are casualties caused by other associated air strikes in Waygal district. A report available on the RAWA site apparently based on a Pajhwok report:
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/07/14/30-civilians-killed-in-nuristan-officials.html
describes these other attacks. Although the numbers may be exaggerated, reliable sources confirm that non-combatants were killed in these strikes. One source claims that these strikes may have been targeting insurgents who had fled into nearby communities.
It is unlikely that these incidents are going to turn the people in Waygal into supporters of the insurgents since they have nothing positive to offer.
But there can be no doubt that the people will keep their distance from the government and Coalition and will resist any type of government/Coalition presence, temporary or permanent, in their area which could lead to combat that in turn could bring the types of lethal military response that kill innocents.
Waygal district, which had been a contested area in which the Coalition and government was making slow and steady inroads, is now effectively ceded to the insurgents.
If you click on the link over “dire consequences” you’ll find a post I wrote immediately preceeding this one noting that there was a mass-casualty attack that killed several dozen innocent civilians nearby, and speculating whether or not that has contributed to an environment that makes these sorts of attacks more likely.
In other words, I think we’re all in strong agreement… I just try to leave the door open to being duped.
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