Retreating Is Surrender, Except When It Isn’t, pt. II
“In 2002,” Rory Stewart wants us to know, “I walked safely along the length of the road between Herat and Obey in western Afghanistan. Recently aid workers were carjacked on that road, and it is now considered too dangerous for aid agencies, effectively closing the main access to the central regions of the country.”
This and similar anecdotes form Stewart’s case for why Afghanistan is such a dangerous and deteriorating place. Perhaps we could summarize his argument as: “Once I walked by myself through a really dangerous country during a lull in the fighting, but now highly visible armed convoys get attacked so we might as well stop trying.”
This isn’t a joke. Stewart very strongly argues for withdrawing more troops, cutting aid spending, and withdrawing aid and security efforts to the “safe” provinces that have been relatively successful. He argues this because, “only the Afghan government has the legitimacy, the knowledge and the power to build a nation.”
It sounds pretty, unless you realize that Hamid Karzai has practically no legitimacy—and this forms the basis of arguments meant to convince us he is still worth propping up (Seth Jones seems to fall for the trap that just because one leader is easy to deal with he is automatically worth supporting… which warrants its own discussion). Furthermore, Stewart insists that we should focus on counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency. How one is achieved without the other in an environment where the insurgency employs terrorism in conjunction with terrorist groups… well, that’s probably better left unsaid. He thinks the military should not to hold territory or pursue the Taliban, but rather “steer Afghanistan away from civil war.”
Does anyone know what that means? Because I really don’t. Has Stewart really come up with nothing better than empty platitudes in the year and a half since he last argued for us doing less?
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Tags: Afghanistan.
Posted by Joshua Foust on July 18th, 2008
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Comments
Time: 7/18/2008, 7:09 am
Josh, do you have a link to the Rory Stewart article?
On an unrelated note, I have it on good information that he’s going to be the next director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at the Harvard Kennedy School, the position that Samantha Power used to hold. I may or may not agree with him on specific points, but he tends to argue his points extremely intelligently (cf. one of the best episodes of Hardtalk I’ve ever seen).
Am I mistaken or have I also heard Barnett Rubin say that adding more troops to Afghanistan is not the answer to the counterinsurgency?
Time: 7/18/2008, 8:39 am
Woah, I’ve added the link where I meant to last night. Perils of blogging after an extra long day at the office.
Stewart’s bio line now includes his future job.
Rubin has said the same thing, but he was much more subtle: he’s said that adding too many troops carries the risk of uniting the country in opposition — something far more nuanced and intelligent than calling for us to draw down our troop levels. Rubin also quite correctly points out that the real problem is cross-border militancy from Pakistan and government corruption, which is a subtlety Stewart lacks in his article.
Time: 7/18/2008, 8:50 am
Josh, I think your reading of this article is a caricature of his argument. Honestly, his position is pretty startling for someone who’s been living in Kabul (which might lead on to think that it’s the center of the world), and he does not say that Pakistan isn’t a problem.
So what exactly should we do about Afghanistan now? First, the West should not increase troop numbers. In time, NATO allies, such as Germany and Holland, will probably want to draw down their numbers, and they should be allowed to do so. We face pressing challenges elsewhere. If we are worried about terrorism, Pakistan is more important than Afghanistan; if we are worried about regional stability, then Egypt, Iran or even Lebanon is more important; if we are worried about poverty, Africa is more important. A troop increase is likely to inflame Afghan nationalism because Afghans are more anti-foreign than we acknowledge and the support for our presence in the insurgency areas is declining. The Taliban, which was a largely discredited and backward movement, gains support by portraying itself as fighting for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign military occupation.
This strategy is far from ideal. But it’s the best option we’ve got. It might not allow us to build an Afghan nation. It would involve a very long-term policy of containment and management, and it may never lead to a clear victory or exit. But unlike abandoning Afghanistan entirely, as we did in 1990, it would not leave a vacuum filled by dangerous neighbors. And unlike a policy of troop increases, this strategy would be less costly, more popular with voters, more sustainable in the long term, less of a distraction from other global priorities and less likely to alienate Afghan nationalists and undermine the Afghan state.
Time: 7/18/2008, 9:07 am
Of course it is a caricature, because this had to be parody. Stewart first notes that Pakistan is driving the counterterrorism agenda, then calls for a focus on rural development because securing the borders is impossible; he notes improvements in Nangarhar are due to one man (he doesn’t say who, because Gul Agha Sherzai is a vicious warlord from Kandahar who was relocated to Nangarhar thanks to the way his venality helped usher in the Taliban to cheers in 1994 and later in 2005, nor does he say that “charisma” really means “command of a personal army”); he’s under the impression that we can “steer” Afghanistan from civil war, but without holding territory or playing an active role in the country’s security situation.
I just don’t get it. His suggestions are long on candy canes and gumdrops, and really short on what else to do.
And I disagree with Rubin on troops levels as well. Afghan officials have called for more troops, and larger training programs for both the ANA and ANP. The entire drive behind Karzai’s push into Paris the other month was to secure more aid, since such a tiny percentage actually reaches villages (meaning more should be sought to make gains at the local level, since realistically he won’t change how wasteful and top-heavy the NGOs and IGOs are). And so on. People there, locals no less, want these things. Where does Stewart get off upbraiding us for dictating to Afghans what they want and need, when he is doing the exact same thing?
Time: 7/18/2008, 10:35 am
On troop levels, I don’t see him saying that the US should drop its numbers–rather that the Germans, Dutch, and others who are having a hard time with their local constituencies could be let off the hook. At this point in the game are either the Dutch or the Germans doing any fighting anyway? If memory serves, the Germans had rules against going out at night in areas far away from the front.
Do we have a sense that the increased US troop levels actually will be used to train police and national army? I haven’t heard Gates, Obama, or McCain say that. It would be nice, but what seems more likely is that they’ll be used to fortify under-resourced positions in danger areas, and that doesn’t necessarily promise better border security. To the contrary, it might invite bigger incursions from across the border.
On warlords, have CIA and Special Ops ended their patronage of them? It’s hardly Stewart’s fault that warlordism has been the de facto US policy.
Here’s a link to an interview with Rubin, who doesn’t seem to be far away from what Stewart is arguing in his article:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080715.wafghanrubin15/BNStory/Afghanistan/
Time: 7/18/2008, 2:26 pm
Ian,
You’re missing something critical: WHAT ABOUT THAT DAM?
I’m referring, of course, to the Kajaki Dam in Helmand province. In March of 2007, he made that the centerpiece of his argument that we need more aid, not less, channeled into grandiose infrastructure projects, not that pesky governance and poverty relief crap.
I bring this up because Stewart’s shifted platitudes somewhat, and is now arguing something totally other than what he argued 16 months ago. Umm, without explanation. So I just don’t believe he’s actually saying anything useful, merely what seems expedient and trendy right now.
Time: 7/18/2008, 3:37 pm
I’ll put aside the fact that it may be a tad unfair to hold a sixteen month-old article against him. I would just point out that basically no one was talking about Afghanistan outside of the blogger elite that long ago.
Platitudes, though–what platitudes? The way I’m reading this, he’s saying that the south is too screwed up to be salvaged, so we should place our bets on the healthier looking horses. Hardly seems like a “platitude.”
Let me fill in a blank in his article though–he doesn’t go into how to deal with the actual source of the Taliban insurgency in 2008. If the US had a policy, ever, of making Musharraf truly accountable for the actions of the ISI (and those elements of the army that are facilitating illegal border crossing), there would be a much smaller insurgency and we wouldn’t be talking about the need for more troops.
Time: 7/18/2008, 3:48 pm
Hence the accusations of platitudes. It is a shallow argument that ignores the real reasons we’re in the mess we’re in. He seems to blame aid and the military being too strong and prevalent, rather than placing those where they belong, which is alongside the very real and very important issue of Pakistan.
Time: 7/20/2008, 3:32 am
To add a pinch of salt to Mr. Stewart’s arguments, a friend of mine who was in Kabul last year, saw the Rory Stewart compound. The locals say he is extremely isolated from them and they dislike him intensely because they see him on TV talking as if he lives among Afghans and knows the real situation. They tend to find his characterizations of them condescending. In fact he never sets foot beyond his high walled compound or has contact with locals.
Time: 7/20/2008, 6:41 am
This isn’t a defense of Stewart in particular–but how does that make him different from all of the Americans working there in an official capacity? I see your point about Afghan perceptions, but does not mixing daily with the general population of Afghanistan rule out commenting intelligently about the country’s affairs?
Also, turn on Meet the Press or CNN and ask yourself whether the folks discussing the needs and desires of “the American people” step out of their bubble all that frequently.
Time: 7/20/2008, 6:28 pm
Ian,
Isn’t that why most people complain the press and politicians are disconnected from regular people and incapable of representing their views? “Everyone does it” doesn’t really get at whether his ideas are valid or not.
Time: 7/20/2008, 7:41 pm
True, but imposing a criterion like “You must interact daily with Afghans (and let’s also add: Afghans of all walks of life) in order plausibly to comment on Afghanistan” rules me and you out as plausible commentators.
Time: 7/20/2008, 8:03 pm
Ian,
Absolutely, but it also means he really doesn’t have any particularly special insight into the country. When that’s the crux of his argument — walking through the countryside six years ago gave him special insight into what Afghans need — I think it highlights my own point very nicely. Which is, he’s full of crap.
Time: 7/20/2008, 9:00 pm
I don’t really think that’s the crux of his argument, and I think others who click back through your link to the article will agree with me. It’s not to the point, but if anything, what qualifies him to speak about the limits and realities of Western occupations in the twenty-first century is his experience as vice-governor of a volatile southern province of Iraq.
Time: 7/20/2008, 9:05 pm
Except that doesn’t make it into his piece. He mentions he did it, but that experience doesn’t inform his recommendations.
Time: 7/20/2008, 9:07 pm
Readers might have a look at this video (starting from 7:36 he talks specifically about comparing Iraq and Afghanistan, and how to empower Afghans to solve Afghanistan’s problems):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nm9xR8G76kI
This is him at least a year ago, saying that more troops are not the answer, but rather a more focused and Afghan-centric application of aid.
Time: 7/20/2008, 9:22 pm
Say Josh, I think you may want to re-read the first take of Stewart’s piece. The first paragraph describes being in an old Raj-era fort in Kabul. He goes on to describe working in the Old City over the last two years, removing garbage and rebuilding shops, schools and so forth. In other words, just because a misled commenter on your site states something — that Stewart never leaves his compound — doesn’t make it a fact. Indeed, Stewart’s work shows it is false.
Indeed Stewart has emerged as one of the most articulate and intelligent voices on Afghanistan in the last few years. Contrary to what you state in your criticism, you actually agree — Stewart says that the borders need to be secured (in other words, the insurgency is coming from Pakistan; the trouble needs to be contained there); he argues for building on our strengths, and not beating our heads against a wall, frittering away precious dollars, for aims that probably will never be reached. He lays out a plan for defeating the Taliban, which involves making local governments more credible.
Stewart also implicitly relies on history. The British got nowhere by adding troops in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Nor did the Soviets. To the contrary, both then-great powers fomented local rebellions that eventually pushed them out. That is Afghanistan’s history of dealing with foreigners.
I don’t think that you can credibly simply dismiss Stewart’s arguments for smarter, targeted use of our resources. I personally think he makes sense.
Best Steve
Time: 7/21/2008, 7:43 am
I find it extremely problematic that a person who has never stepped a foot on Afghan soil - JOSH - can pretend to be the great expert. Stewart knows the country well and has dedicated a good part of his life helping Afghans. It is very easy for a sheltered analyst within the beltway to criticize others. Indeed every day Josh attacks others who know the country and actually work towards helping it. I judge this blog as at times enlightening but usually just a vehicle for a self described expert to beat his drum. Darn… Josh can spend a LOT of time attacking others. Keep attacking Josh, you are only kidding yourself. I would suggest you take a long look at yourself. That would be an excellent starting point. Then move on to others, but make it professional..please. Your rants and raves get tiring!
Time: 7/21/2008, 8:26 am
See, now, the anonymous observer’s comment is exactly the problem with setting up arbitrary criteria for what qualifies someone to comment about Afghanistan. Of course Josh is qualified to comment about Afghanistan, and he’s even qualified to critique other people’s opinions. If he and Stewart come to different conclusions, it’s not because one is smart and one is full of crap–they just have very different sets of starting assumptions. I like to read both.
Time: 7/21/2008, 8:36 am
Of course hecan comment on the observations of others. The problem is that we owe it to ourselves and others to comment in a sane and professional maaner. Unfortunately, Joshua has a real tendency to attack and throw out the baby with the bathwater. Dogmatism and vengence keeps Joshua from being a critic I can listne to. Civility and professionalsm (not too metion fairness) goes a long way. I suspect that our comments will be removed by Josh.
Time: 7/21/2008, 8:48 am
Observer, you really seem to be stuck on an issue that has nothing to do with this post, but for the record (which Josh can feel free to delete; it’s his blog after all) I don’t see why bloggers should have to make a full disclosure to the public in order to have comments taken seriously.
After all, you refuse to identify yourself, and I’m answering you.
Time: 7/21/2008, 9:01 am
I respect your opinion. I just believe even a blog can be civil!
Time: 7/21/2008, 9:05 am
Observer,
I am not ambiguous about the rules for commenting here. If you have a problem with me, go ahead and raise them with me. I will not tolerate the broadcasting of unfounded rumors and speculation about my employer, nor will I tolerate trying to interfere with it in any way. I don’t blog about work, period. And I won’t allow you or anyone to ruin that just because you’re mad I disagree with someone.
As to the substance of what you say, if you think I don’t have the “right” to blog about Afghanistan… well there are plenty of other places you can go. Frankly, if you’re that shallow, I don’t really want you reading this blog anyway. And as for civility, reexamine what you tried to pull here, and then compare it to me arguing with people’s ideas. Thinking someone is misguided or naive is not the same as thinking they’re a bad person.
As for being self-aware enough to comment, I am still waiting for you to tell us who you are, instead of hiding behind a pseudonym like a coward. At least I have the balls to stand up behind my ideas.
And Ian, thanks for the support. I found the video with Stewart enlightening, not least because he acknowledges being an Orientalist but then argues there’s nothing wrong with it. However, much of what he says makes sense — he and I agree the International Community has not done enough for the country, and that trying to alter Afghan culture is a horrible idea.
However, when people working on the ground, from local aid workers all the way up to Hamid Karzai complain that there simply are not enough resources to achieve concrete reconstruction objectives, it is difficult to argue that more aid is not needed. Stewart exists in a fantasyland where you can magically make the UN and large international NGOs have no overhead where 90% of their budgets go toward local projects. That world simply does not exist. And given the state of deteriorating security in the country, I’m baffled how he expects these projects to get done without more troops to create secure environments.
Furthermore, in his article, he specifically argues that trying to contain and marginalize the Taliban groups is a fool’s errand, when that is precisely what needs to be done in order to avoid their creating a permanent presence.
This gets at what Steve was saying. Stewart and I agree on the macro picture to a large extent, which is that a lot of very short-sighted, locally-ignorant decisions have been made, and I probably erred in not highlighting that. In particular on the issue of aid, I’ve been yelling for about two years now that aid needs to be channeled through the national government, rather than through the foreigner shadow economy.
But this is where he and I part ways—I see the security environment deteriorating where there are not enough troops to provide space for the government to work (Stewart doesn’t seem to like acknolwedging that there is a rather large U.S. presence in Nangarahar), and I think “well, we need more troops to help create more secure environments.” He thinks the opposite. But then says we need to steer Afghanistan away from civil war. How he intends to do that is, I suppose, left for us to ponder.
Which is why I accuse him of being in a fantasy land and spouting platitudes. Much as he tries to deny it, his ideas would not only make Afghanistan less popular in Western polities (by making it appear we don’t care about it), but he would be sowing the seeds for a repeat of 1994.
Time: 7/21/2008, 9:23 am
I suspect that our comments will be removed by Josh.
Actually, it’s far more likely that I’ll do that. Josh doesn’t like deleting comments. My tolerance for bullshit — particularly anonymous bullshit — is much, much lower.
Time: 7/21/2008, 9:29 am
Um, I think you misunderstand when he references Orientalism; again, here’s the link and the timing you refer to is 2:37:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nm9xR8G76kI
I’ll bet other readers will concur with me that he’s not exactly wrapping himself in the imperialist purple here.
One thing that needs to be taken into account when you read Stewart is his attentiveness to European politics, which as a spectrum, has a lot harder time justifying military participation. While the American left has pretty much jumped on board the Obama surge strategy in Afghanistan, the European left is still pissed about Iraq. The fact that Steward knows how to attend to a rhetoric that Europe needs to hear is not a bad thing; in fact it puts him outside of the fairy-tale fantasy land that Sec. Gates lives in, where grumbling and throwing elbows at European countries is supposed to convince them that pouring in more of their troops is a good idea.
Time: 7/21/2008, 9:41 pm
He’s not, though one so gloriously local in his tastes must surely understand the structural reasons underpinning the mostly Pashtun conflict. Alas, he seems not to.
And I didn’t see his comments addressed at Canada, or Germany, or NATO. He addressed them to an American audience.
Time: 7/23/2008, 7:01 pm
For those of you who are taking Rory Stewart’s article seriously, Christian Bleuer has an excellent rebuttal at Complex Terrain Laboratory, link here:
http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2008/7/21/saving-afghanistan-a-response-to-rory-stewart.html
I don’t agree with everything here, but I do have to agree with his adducing one of a very few comprehensive surveys of Afghan public opinion to refute Stewart’s anecdotal reportage of his coworkers’ opinions.
Time: 7/23/2008, 7:17 pm
Ian, thanks for pointing this out. Frankly, I was too annoyed by the article to lay out point by point why I thought it was naive and misguided. Christian did the work I should have (we’ve both pointed to the Asia Foundation surveys before for countering “conventional wisdom” about Afghan opinions).
I, too, don’t see a complete reversion to 1992-2001 as he says, but I do think Stewart’s plan for troop levels and aid levels would keep us relatively frozen where we are now, which is no good and, ultimately, a losing proposition for the government.
Time: 7/23/2008, 8:14 pm
Christian’s best line, for our purposes, is:
There is, however, no danger of either McCain or Obama following Rory Stewart’s advice.
There’s intellectual value in having another look at the working assumptions, though. Especially because blindly “surging” doesn’t seem like it would have the same effect it did in Iraq.
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