How Pakistan Disproves Traditional Realism

Graham Allison, author of one of the best books on political decision-making frameworks I’m aware of (which made for a surprisingly fascinating semester-long study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by the way) weighs in on Musharraf’s defeat:

How vigorously would a new democratic government support the US-led war on terrorism in which Pakistan’s army is now fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates headquartered in Pakistan’s ungoverned Northwest Territories? Would such a government be more likely to cooperate with the United States and NATO in the ongoing but faltering war against the Taliban in Afghanistan? Recall again that the rise of the Taliban took place during the term of Musharraf’s civilian predecessors, including Nawaz Sharif, the leader of one of the parties that won in Monday’s election.

The answer to each of these questions is as unambiguous as it is uncomfortable…The United States has two vital national interests in Pakistan: first, to prevent any of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and bomb-making materials from being stolen, sold or transferred to terrorists; second, to destroy Al Qaeda’s leadership, sanctuary, and training camps. Neither interest will be advanced by a transition from the devil we know to the new democratic Pakistani government.

While rightly noting that Pakistanis hate only the U.S. more than they hate Musharraf, it is worth pondering why that is the case. By his own admission, Musharraf, who, recall again, was actively funding and expanding the Taliban as a proxy force across Afghanistan as of September 10, 2001, only decided to support the U.S. in order to avoid a strategic bombing campaign. Up to that point, he was pretty popular—certainly not the subject of numerous assassination attempts and countless popular uprisings.

At best, Musharraf can be labeled a reluctant ally—which is why he’s done no more than we have in pursuit of Osama bin Laden, and why he tacitly acceded to the Talibanization of Pashtunistan. Put simply: even as Afghanistan descended further into chaos and madness, he still cared about Indian Kashmir (recall again that Musharraf engineered his coup over Sharif during the fallout of the Kargil War he started). As such, the Taliban were not a concern. It is only as he undertook actions that, by his own logic, went against Pakistan’s interest—again, under the threat of U.S. bombs—that his popularity flagged. As it did, he cracked down quite spectacularly, canceling elections and sacking members of the judiciary.

To summarize the messy and brief history above: Allison’s characterization of Musharraf as a bastion protecting American interests is misleading (though obviously not intentionally). Musharraf’s feckless border policies, which have actually done a great deal to encourage the forces of extremism there—the quite welcome routing of extremist parties on Monday notwithstanding—has in fact actively undermined the interests Allison lists as prime. In that context, the “devil we know” is in fact a worse chance to take than a newly democratic government.

Looking at Allison’s two interests (and the U.S. really has many more, though good luck getting a politician to say even these), one can see that Musharraf is actually the lesser of the available evils:

• to prevent any of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and bomb-making materials from being stolen, sold or transferred to terrorists
• to destroy Al Qaeda’s leadership, sanctuary, and training camps

Allison’s assertion that Musharraf’s defeat will not advance these is wrong; his presidency did nothing to advance them, either. Thanks to Musharraf’s anti-liberal policies, and his decisions to severely crackdown not on the religious extremists actively trying to undermine Pakistani society but on the lawyers, judges, and democracy activists trying to save it (not to mention the obvious corruption in cutting backroom deals with Bhutto and Sharif to drop the very real corruption charges against each in return for their legitimizing the election) in the name of the Army, national trust in the Army is actually way down.

Similarly, Musharraf has done precious little to encourage the neutralization of al-Qaeda’s leadership, save cutting sweetheart deals with local tribesmen to avoid any tough fighting (recall if you will the two separate cease fires in Waziristan). While it is unlikely any civilian coalition, especially one run by the same two dynasties that screwed up Pakistan in the first place, will be able to stand up to the ISI or even the Army should it assert itself, a democratically elected government will at least be somewhat responsive to its people.

And the people of Pakistan have decisively rejected extremism—far more strongly than Musharraf’s policies ever did. Supporting Pervez Musharraf was the wrong decision all along, and the blind faith in “devil you know” realism from otherwise brilliant men like Allison is why we’re left in the situation we now have. Contrary to Allison’s ending quip: democracy in Pakistan is neither “instant” (it’s was quite vigorous before Musharraf canceled it), nor is it the policy of wishful thinking. A democratic, civilian government in Islamabad won’t be nearly the false puppet Musharraf was; but both Pakistan and the U.S. will be far better off as a result.

Far from pie-in-the-sky thinking, a democratically elected government—despite its many obvious flaws—is the preferable choice.