Below is another dispatch from the RRG for the Prevention of Torture in Uzbekistan, who earlier sent a report on the plight of Uzbekistan’s labor migrants. This time, members of the RRG weigh in on the recent release of imprisoned human rights activists and the increased lip service the Uzbek government is paying to human rights as it tries to recultivate ties with Europe and the United States. — Nathan
RAPID RESPONSE GROUP (RRG) FOR PREVENTION OF TORTURE IN UZBEKISTAN
EXPERT COMMENTARY: ON RELEASE OF IMPRISONED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AND INCREASING OFFICIAL RHETORIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN UZBEKISTAN
Introduction:
The present expert commentary of the RRG aims at providing an expert opinion on the development of the latest situation with human rights in Uzbekistan. The expert commentary touches the analysis of the two latest tendencies marked in Uzbekistan from the beginning of February 2008. These tendencies are release from prison of several Uzbek human rights defenders who were imprisoned to different terms in the course of the latest 3-4 years, and increasing official rhetoric on stressing the issues of protection and promotion of human rights in Uzbekistan and wide coverage of the given issue through domestic mass-media (for instance, lately several conferences and round-table discussions on the issues of human rights, national and international mechanisms of protection of human rights, problem of human trafficking, with participation of the government officials, representatives of the GONGOs – government organized NGOs, and representatives of some international intergovernmental organizations have been organized in Tashkent).
The given expert commentary is prepared by Shukhrat Ganiev and Sukhrobjon Ismoilov, members of the RRG. In spite of the fact that the expert commentary is published on behalf of the RRG, the other members of the RRG reserve the right to disagree with Sh. Ganiev and S. Ismoilov’s opinions stated here.
We hope this commentary shall trigger targeted and unemotional polemics on what the above mentioned tendencies actually mean, reasons, consequences and conclusion deriving from those tendencies for a civil society and international community. This commentary is based on personal opinions. However, we believe it can be accepted as a starting point for analysis, disputes and development of a common strategy and actions for all stakeholders.
The experts’ comments:
Commentary by Shukhrat Ganiev:
As one of the observers living in Uzbekistan and proceeding from the analysis of the situation in the regions of the country, I think here is what is going on:
1. Those tendencies have been pushed by all latest initiatives as a whole: a) Imposing sanctions by the European Union following the notoriously known “Andijan events”, b) launched international campaigns in support of arrested activists, c) disappointment in the politics of the Russian Federation regarding Uzbekistan and failure of the expectations of huge financial investments from the Kremlin.
2. It is also necessary to take into consideration changes in the generations of the high-rank state officials in power structures and appointment of some young technocrats to supervisory posts in some ministries and departments of the government, coming to power of so-called pro-western government officials – for instance, V. Norov, R. Azimov, the new Minister of Justice, some advisers of the President, and because of aging the natural process of rotation of the lower rank officials on the regional and lower levels of the state power. One of the reasons for relevantly soft attitude of Germany and Spain on the issue of imposing international sanctions on Uzbekistan was also successful lobbying of the official position of Uzbekistan carried out by some of such young high-rank technocrats in Uzbekistan.
3. Releasing imprisoned human rights activists and only imprisoned human rights activists is nothing more than a tested old strategy of bargaining and negotiating with the West. It would be naïve to believe that the political prisoners (imprisoned members of opposition parties, prisoners of conscience). It is premature to assess release of several imprisoned human rights defenders as a beginning point of deep changes in the country.
4. How the latest presidential elections in December 2007 took place has calmed down the Uzbek authorities. How the elections have taken place, how the West and the Uzbek society have reacted to it demonstrated that the current authorities in Uzbekistan are firmly holding the power in their hands. This calming down is one of the root reasons of mitigation of the official attitude to civil society and release of the imprisoned human rights activists right after the elections.
What should be done in order to gain maximum benefits from the current situation?
1. We should accept the game rules established by the authorities, certainly, to a reasonable degree. Those rules are the following:
a) To remain temporarily out of political requirements and work strictly within the boundaries of the existing national legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, even knowing the national legislation’s discrepancy to the international norms;
b) Not praising the release of the imprisoned human rights defenders as a victory over the Uzbek authorities (even if so it is), and trying to talk to the authorities without a position of requirements;
c) Choosing to work in those directions where there is an opportunity to achieve minimal dialogue and exchange of opinions with the authorities. In my opinion, for today these directions could be the following – problems of labor migration, child’s rights, women’s rights, social and economic problems.
2. To try constantly searching for allies in the face of the government officials in government structures of power, rebuilding the bridges to the Uzbek authorities, relying on the allies found in the face of the government officials taking attempts of the official registration of the new national NGOs and representative missions of international non-governmental organizations in the Ministry of Justice.
3. Creation of and supporting opportunities for participation and involving of the youth in independent debate clubs in the format of independent think-tanks in the regions of Uzbekistan.
4. Together with the Kazakhstani and Russian NGOs creation of effective regional projects involving Central Asia focusing on such common problems as prison monitoring, rights of the labor migrants and other issues.
5. Supporting the growth of a new generation of human rights defenders in Uzbekistan who will be committed to the consolidated human rights activity, instead of looking for enemies in everyone and everywhere and who won’t have such bad qualities as clannish ideology, authoritativeness, absence of professionalism characteristic for both GONGOs and independent NGOs.
Commentary by Sukhrobjon Ismoilov:
1. Problems understood by everybody but which many try not to notice:
1.1. Regarding the issue of increasing official rhetoric on protection and promotion of human rights in Uzbekistan:
a) About limits on freedom of speech and critical thinking in this rhetoric: It is obvious that the main purpose of increasing official rhetoric on protection of human rights in Uzbekistan marked recently is a state propagation of the existence of a steady state policy on protection and promotion of fundamental human rights in the country. The given propagation is basically meant for convincing the Uzbek society and international community in this. There is no place for critical discussions of the real situation with human rights in Uzbekistan in this rhetoric. The agenda of all latest events (conference, round tables and etc.) for supporting this rhetoric and their participants are created only proceeding from this purpose. Such actions on propagation of the idea of existence of effective national system for protection of basic human rights in the country are inherently considered single time and showy events, therefore ideas and measures voiced during such events mainly remain not achieved and only on the paper. Another trouble is that the organizers of the given propagation because of the fear to show their creative \ critical thinking, accomplish their tasks so unprofessionally and primitively that the events they organize and conduct often bring to a boomerang effect in the public consciousness.
b) About the role of the state organizations (law enforcement bodies, the state departments, the government organized centers and institutes) and GONGOs participating in this rhetoric: Their agenda and programs attract by such qualities as pretentiousness, decorative effect, absence of precise seeing of the expected end result. Absence of steady sources of financing, and for GONGOs – independent sources of financing. Absence of an incentive for searching for independent sources of financing of the programs. Practically no budgetary planning with a view of all expected expenditures needed for implementation of the goals and tasks. Both at the state organizations, and at NGO sector absence of strategic thinking and the skill of independent program management. All events organized by those actors are meant to create a decorative effect, dated for important days and anniversaries and consequently have no effect in the long-term prospect. It is troublesome that the government feels comfortable with working with such amorphous organizations. Therefore in the short-term prospect the critical thinking NGOs and other actors of the civil society will not be allowed to take part in this process.
с) About the role of international organizations and donors: International organizations and donors which have worked in Uzbekistan in the past have operated using approximately the following scheme. We shall come to the country, we shall conduct a couple of training and seminars for the target groups, we shall organize a couple of study tours abroad, we shall provide financial support for implementation of the projects and programs of the local NGOs, then there will come democracy, human rights will be respected more. Such sincere installation and confidence have predetermined many things in the work of international organizations in Uzbekistan. Probably international development organizations have worked in the same way in many other countries of the world. International organizations did not manage to develop strategy which would allow to raise professionalism and efficiency of the local NGOs. The local NGOs have remained not ready to sudden leaving of international organizations and donors from Uzbekistan. Instead of being ready to carry out and accept as normal, long and consecutive (and sometimes wearisome) work for achievement of any positive change on this or that question, the local NGOs also began to pursue single time, showy projects and programs.
d) Human Rights Defenders: Attempts from independent human rights defenders to provide a corrective check through monitoring and reporting on instances of human rights violations have suffered multi-fold subjective problems. A single individual, often with a fairly strong personality, dominates most Uzbek human rights organizations. Taking into consideration that after Andijan events of May 2005 many real and pseudo-human rights defenders have left Uzbekistan, today actively working human rights defenders barely make up 10-15 persons in maximum. Most Uzbek human rights defenders lack both the resources and regional presence to fully and accurately represent the nature and extent of abuse in Uzbekistan. As a partial result of the above, much reporting emanating from Uzbekistan is too political in nature to gain credibility among the range of potential target audiences. Most Uzbek human rights defenders orient themselves to accept as an enemy the Uzbek authorities. While the prevailing majority among the Uzbek human rights defenders agree that it is necessary to establish dialogue with the authorities, most are convinced that it is not possible in any way to establish such dialogue with the present authorities. The human rights community is incredibly fragmented, divided by both personal and professional animosity. Since international organizations fund virtually all independent civil society activity, competition is stiff and largely limited to known figures both in and outside Uzbekistan. A strong sense of mutual competition reinforces the challenges of the small number of traditional human rights defenders still actively working in Uzbekistan. Uzbek human rights groups rarely work together in coalitions and networks; the few instances of limited cooperation have usually occurred under close guidance from an international organization and were characterized as temporary coalitions.
1.2. On the issue of releasing from prison several imprisoned human rights defenders: It is impossible to accept the release from prison of several imprisoned human rights defenders as a beginning of real changes in Uzbekistan. It is also impossible to accept this as a result of the international pressure by the side of the European Union, the US, other western countries and international organizations. Several imprisoned human rights defenders have been exempted from execution of the punishment appointed on them by the court sentence, amnestied, but not acquitted and not rehabilitated. I have an impression that those amnestied human rights defenders have expressed a tacit consent to behave “normally” in the eyes of the authorities after being released.
2. Conclusion:
2.1. Strengthening organizational and human resources of the local NGOs and civil society, raising their professionalism and strategic thinking skills.
2.2. Training of the local NGO activists on planning and management.
2.2. Encouraging and supporting project proposals directed on consolidation of the local NGOs with each other based on common interests.
2.3. Finding ways to jump into the ongoing official rhetoric on improvement of the system of for protection of human rights and democratic reforms in Uzbekistan and trying to change the state apparatus from inside, by offering constructive alternative opinion on the problematic issues.
2.4. Refusing using “black P.R.” in the tactics of the NGOs and civil society even if the authorities are willing to apply “black P.R. in order to discredit unwanted persons and public figures”.
2.5. As a counterbalance to chasing individual cases and problems of separate communities focusing on strategically important issues of huge significance the solution of which can change the public opinion in a broad sense and cause system reforms.
2.6. Strengthening analytical, research types of activities of the local NGOs and by carrying out such activities trying to influence the public opinion and push it, finding allies and adherents among various social and professional groups of the population by doing so.
2.7. Supporting and assisting to projects and initiatives aiming at carrying out long-term, consecutive, steady and result-oriented work on certain socially important problems.
3. Factors of possible risks:
3.1. Remembering that despite a seeming success and progress in the situation, every moment it is objectively possible that a setback in all of the achieved progress might happen.
3.2. If international organizations shall be allowed to return to work in Uzbekistan, they can repeat their previous mistakes not having managed to be well oriented under the changed conditions.
3.3. Human rights defenders and NGOs will not manage to distance themselves from the issues and problems which are painfully perceived by the authorities.
3.4. Both for the state authorities, and for the NGOs, it would be erroneous to think that nongovernmental noncommercial organizations should work free of charge. In order to reach the declared noble goal and objectives the NGOs should have sufficient financial means. In order to be interested in working for the NGO sector and be satisfied with what they are doing the persons who have devoted themselves to the nongovernmental noncommercial sector, should earn adequately.
3.5. The tendency of copying of reactions of the Russian authorities with regard to the presence of international and foreign organizations in the premises of the country might grow.
3.5. International community can lose interest in supporting democratic and human rights initiatives in Uzbekistan.
February 8th 2008
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Comments on this entry are closed.