It is remarkable that people express surprise when Kabul is unhappy with Britain unilaterally interfering in its affairs, no matter how well-intentioned.
A secret British plan to build military training camps for former Taliban fighters in Helmand has sent Afghan-UK relations to an all-time low, say officials.
Kabul had no knowledge of attempts to persuade fighters to switch sides and train to fight in local militias until the plan was exposed last December, they said.
Western diplomats and Afghan officials said the plan was a UK initiative. The British embassy in Kabul refused to comment.
Now really, this is just inconsiderate. Have the last 150 years really meant nothing? It makes sense to see Afghanistan as the big test for NATO’s continued relevance. But why is it taking until 2008 for papers like the FT to write stuff like this?
From the outset, the insufficient commitment of resources and diversion of attention towards the wrong target in Iraq forced the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies into no more than a tactical retreat. Not only that, but the techniques of Iraqi insurgents – especially roadside bombs and suicide attacks – are now a vicious feature of the Afghan arena. No less damaging was to respond to Afghan government limitations and the return of the warlords with boosterism and a blind eye.
But all this is now pretty much conventional wisdom. How to address it is the issue, and these reports help by getting relevant ideas into the mainstream of US debate, where the Afghan conflict is still overshadowed by Iraq.
Naturally, being British, they think it a shame Hamid Karzai was uneasy with what amounted to a British viceroy overseeing the “new” effort to make his country a not-disaster. They also complain about conventional wisdom while saying nothing more than “the key is capacity-building alongside the security campaigns”—precisely what the World Bank and IMF have been attempting at least as far back as 2003.
Lending credibility to the foolish British plan to unilaterally re-arm former Taliban—in the midst of the above piece complaining about encouraging warlordism—does not help, however. How about, instead of arming men who have a proven track record of taking money and arms from whatever foreign power happens to be nearby, whether Pakistan or the U.S., and using it against them, NATO and the U.S. try a genuinely innovative strategy?
They could start with abandoning the stupid and counterproductive counternarcotics program. As should be blindingly obvious by now, opium is not the primary driver of instability in the country—as provinces like Baghlan and Badakhshan have become progressively more calm, their share of the country’s opium crop has dropped steadily. And provinces like Helmand and Uruzgan have seen spikes in opium production only after the Taliban established permanent presences there. That is because opium is not the problem—the Taliban is.
Another step could be bothering to live up to our own promises. George W. Bush has been vocal about how much Afghanistan matters, how he was going to start a new Marshall Plan for the country, how much he likes Hamid Karzai and wants to see the place succeed. Perhaps doing any of that could help as well—say, providing the agricultural assistance promised to farmers who give up opium, or providing enough troops to partially settled provinces to encourage the progress there and not indicate to the villagers the West’s presence is a temporary footnote to a permanent Taliban.
It’s not much, but it’s a start. But let’s leave the Brits out of planning this one, yes?
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1771 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor.
{ 10 comments }
I particularly liked this bit from the FT article:
‘The plan envisaged a camp for 2,000 former Taliban fighters offering vocational and military training, with the provision of communications equipment, including satellite phones.’
Exsqueeze me? vocational what?! Do they mean serving lattes at Starbies? working in a call-centre? stitching footballs? directing traffic? since when has the Western military been running vocational training for militants and terrorists?
Josh, Thanks for keeping on top of Afghan news. It is nice to read a perspective that does not bash Karzai for American and British mistakes…Bringing the Taliban back into the government for “power sharing” will have to go down as one of the stupidest moves in the history of either warfare or peacemaking–after permitting Osama Bin Laden to establish base camp in Pakistan’s tribal areas… I think Karzai was against both of these US/UK plans, which have only served to “re-gen” extremism under political cover, as had been predicted at the time by critics of the move…
Hmm yes, because America’s record in intervening in Islamic countries is just so damn good, isn’t it? I’m not going to defend Britain’s history of intervention in either Afghanistan or Iraq, as in both countries it has been disastrous ever since the original occupation of Kabul in 1839. However, I would venture to suggest that the U.S.A. is now catching up fast in cack-handed invasion stakes. The key failure to plan for the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, the blind belief that western troops would be ‘welcomed’, the immediate disbanding of the Iraqi army and police force, the inability to recognise that deposing Saddam would make the Shia the dominant community there and strengthen the hand of Iran in the country: all these must be laid at America’s door, or at any rate at that of the boneheaded Neocon ideologues who ‘masterminded’ the occupation. When a total moron like John Bolton can be made the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., you have to wonder about the people making America’s foreign policy decisions. As for Afghanistan, I have a friend currently serving with the British force in Helmand Province, and she says that the single greatest problem they face is the American penchant for bombing indiscriminately (because they’re not prepared to risk casualties in a ground war) and killing large numbers of civilians. It is this, along with the anti-narcotics programme, which drives people into the arms of the Taliban, ratchets up hostility to the British presence and leads to increased mortar attacks, mines and roadside bombs. The British are the only other NATO country apart from Canada to be making a significant contribution in the really dangerous regions of Afghanistan. Insulting them and the casualties they’ve been taking might not be the best idea.
Alexander, a couple of things:
1) Iraq is immaterial to this discussion, which is about Britain’s centuries-old problem of unilaterally interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs
2) You won’t find me defending the last six years of American policy in either country, as I largely agree with you (a cursory glance through our archives will back this up)
3) This isn’t insulting Britain by any stretch, merely pointing out folly
4) Your friend in Helmand must not realize that airstrikes in Afghanistan come just as often from NATO planes (either French sorties from their carrier that was stationed in the Gulf, or from Bagram airfield) as from American planes. I agree the overreliance on air strikes is problematic — again, search our archives — but the U.S. is not alone. There is a good reason Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has taken such a strong stance against larger bombs for NATO countries.
To summarize: that’s a nice dodge, but you still can’t lay all of this at America’s feet. There is nothing wrong with taking responsibility for your own contribution to the problem. Just as Germany looks terrible for it’s borderline cowardice in its use of caveats and proclamations of doom, so Britain should fess up it has no business trying to repeat Auckland’s Folly.
Fair points – I’m perfectly willing to accept that the British have contributed to the current mess, but I wrote in some anger as you appeared to be suggesting that a) they were entirely responsible for it and b) that if only the Americans were allowed to do things their way everything would be fine (this was the relevance of Iraq). To describe this as ‘unilateral intervention’ is stretching things a bit: the British are only in Afghanistan because of their responsibilities to NATO, participating in an operation which has been led by the U.S. from the beginning. There is a widespread feeling in the British army, and in the country more generally, that the U.S.A. has shown little gratitude for the contribution of our severely over-stretched armed forces to their bungled ‘war on terror’ (remember, the British army only has about 120,000 men). I’m not sure about the bombings, but I know that there is a lack of communication between the American forces fighting in Helmand and the British who are supposed to be ‘peacekeeping there’ (those were the false pretences under which they were originally sent in), which often leads to the soldiers on the ground only finding out about bombing raids once news of the casualties starts filtering through. The local population, needless to say, do not distinguish between the different elements of the NATO force. As for ‘Auckland’s folly’: his crowning folly once the invasion had taken place was to cut the subsidies paid to the tribes outside Kabul. I fear the British attempt to reach some sort of deal with those they’re fighting reflects nothing more than grim political realities. And Karzai knows perfectly well that if it weren’t for the NATO presence he would end up hanging from the nearest lamp-post like Najibullah.
Wait, so you complained about U.S. actions you didn’t even know didn’t happen? Hrm.
Also, allow me to quote Merriam-Webster:
That sure seems like the British behavior going behind everyone’s back to engage in a questionable deal of questionable utility against the interests, intentions, and preferences of all other parties. Hence, the PNGing of those two diplomats.
Lastly, I hate to be this churlish, but an overstretched army is a tough sell to this American—again, had you briefly traipsed through our archives, you’d see over-reach is a near-constant complaint. The British are doing Afghanistan the favor of removing troops from Basra so a few hundred might eventually arrive in Helmand. But it is no favor if they arm the Taliban and give them satellite phones. That is the opposite of progress.
And if the British seriously thought they’d be doing peacekeeping when ISAF took over in 2006, then they’re dumb and they deserve every hard knock on the head they can get. No one paying even an ounce of attention to Afghanistan at the time (and granted, that list was vanishingly, and depressingly, small at the time) thought there would be no fight—the Taliban have been rising in numbers and brutality since at least 2005, and 2006/7 was right when their strength and numbers were cresting. Again, I’ve written of this quite a bit, that NATO expressing surprise they might actually have to fight in Afghanistan is evidence of appalling leadership and appalling intelligence work. The New York Times knew the country was in worsening shape in 2006; why didn’t the British Army?
And your point about Auckland is partially right, but Auckland’s biggest mistake was invading the country in the first place, assuming a hated and rejected tyrant could be forced on an unwelcoming people. Shujah was a dumb choice, the British were arrogant and petty with Dost Mohammed, and they unfortunately got exactly what they deserved.
Dealing with Afghanistan on Britain’s term has a centuries-long history of failure. How about dealing with Afghanistan on Afghanistan’s terms? Or even making a shallow play at responding to any of their needs and concerns?
The trouble is, who’s to say what ‘Afghanistan’s terms’ are? Because they certainly aren’t simply whatever Karzai says he wants. I actually agree that the proposal to arm ex- Taliban was criminally stupid, but trying to talk to them isn’t: it might indeed be seen as ‘responding to the needs and concerns’ of those unfortunate enough to live in Helmand who want to see the fighting stop.
I don’t think the army were under any illusion that they wouldn’t be fighting a fierce ground war as soon as they got to Helmand, but that isn’t what the British public were told. Our thuggish Defence Secretary at the time, John Reid, famously stated that they would probably be able to serve out their time there ‘without firing a single shot’ (I’m not joking, I wish I was).
And re Auckland – obviously I agree, and invading to remove Dost Muhammad was a catastrophic and indefensible folly in both strategic and moral terms. The current situation might register a bit better on the morality scale, but in the end we’re still in a mess.
Well – Reid said he ‘hoped’ they would return after three years ‘without firing a shot’, when he must have known that was completely impossible. It’s all about spin…
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6096206.stm
This makes some quite good points – not that Toynbee’s any kind of expert.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2254469,00.html
You’re right – I didn’t say Karzai’s terms. I said Afghanistan’s. That means the Hazarajat has different needs than Nuristan, which has different needs than the southern provinces, which have different needs than Herat. Deal with it on its own terms.
A government improperly selling the wrong war? Nope, never heard of that
But again, that’s internal folly. It’s not something to blame on the U.S. for “starting it.”
And finally, you’re right that talking to ex-Taliban is not that bad an idea (though I would question how well they determine ex versus current-yet-low key). When Britain was just talking to the Taliban Karzai was partially on board, even if he was annoyed he didn’t have the chance to initiate it and was thus further humiliated and made to look even more like a puppet. The British talking to the Taliban was not the issue here; it was their secret plan to unilaterally arm and train them. That was the dumb idea, and it was what got their diplomats expelled (and, I think, what sank Ashdown’s bid).
But hey, look on the bright side: at least the British press is having a healthy debate about what’s going on there. It’s tough to find more than a generic “stay the course” editorial in the U.S.