Angling for Failure?

Thanks perhaps to you-know-who, Colombian counternarcotics officers are training Afghan recruits in close-quarters combat, drug interdiction, and other skills of the craft.

It is a measure of this country’s virulent opium trade, which has helped revive the Taliban while corroding the credibility of the Afghan government, that American officials hope that Afghanistan’s drug problem will someday be only as bad as that of Colombia.

While the Latin American nation remains the world’s cocaine capital and is still plagued by drug-related violence, American officials argue that decades of American counternarcotics efforts there have at least helped stabilize the country…

“I wanted the Colombians to come here to give the Afghans something to aspire to,” Mr. Balbo said. “To instill the fact that they have been doing this for years, and it has worked.”

Woops, I just lolled all over myself. Stabilized Colombia? Well, in some parts, yes. But FARC still controls vast swaths of the country—and in those areas, there are non-government taxes, school systems, and institutions, almost like a quasi-state.

Oh, and the government death squads. Let’s not forget them. Notice how everyone is wearing bullet vests? You see that among the VIPs in Bogota. Indeed, the International Crisis Group just last month released a report on the growing problem of armed groups roaming the countryside. I daresay Mr. Balbo, who heads the Kabul branch of the DEA, is whitewashing the situation in Colombia. Why would you want to replicate such a disaster?

I think that NYT article might offer a reason why: laziness.

“There may have been things one could have done earlier on, but at this stage, I think there are relatively limited good options,” said James F. Dobbins, a former State Department official who served as the administration’s special representative on Afghanistan…

The State Department and Pentagon repeatedly clashed over drug policy, according to current and former officials who were interviewed.

Pentagon leaders refused to bomb drug laboratories and often balked at helping other agencies and the Afghan government destroy poppy fields, disrupt opium shipments or capture major traffickers, the officials say.

Former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and military leaders also played down or dismissed growing signs that drug money was being funneled to the Taliban, the officials say.

And the Central Intelligence Agency and the military turned a blind eye to drug-related activities by prominent warlords or political figures they had installed in power, Afghan and American officials say.

Not so long ago, Afghanistan was touted as a success, a country freed from tyranny and Al Qaeda. But as the Taliban’s grip continues to tighten, threatening Afghanistan’s future and the fight against terrorism, Americans and Afghans increasingly are asking what went wrong. To that, some American officials say that failing to disrupt the drug trade was a critical strategic mistake.

Gee, ya think? It was never a secret that opium was a deeply destabilizing factor in Afghan society. In the early 80′s, opium cultivation, while not explicitly approved by the U.S., was tacitly allowed as a fundraising strategy by the mujahideen in the Soviet Bleed campaign. After the withdrawal, even under Najibullah’s administration but especially after his overthrow, opium was a key component of the warlordism that churned the countryside.

Frankly, to pretend that opium wouldn’t play a role in post-Taliban society was idiotic, as the Taliban was the only group that seemed capable of a significant drop in production (unless it was really the drought in 2000 that caused such a big drop in cultivation).

So now we’re left with a situation in which much instability and corruption is caused by an endemic opium trade. Situationally, it does indeed closely resemble Colombia, and is worse in many ways (including access to global markets, economic indicators, and so on). But, Colombia cannot be said to be a success. In fact, it is a failure in almost every way from a counternarcotics perspective—from corrupt government to extreme levels of violence to illicit trade volume. It just hasn’t worked.

Afghanistan, however, offers a solution different than the traditional eradication campaign: while there isn’t much legitimate use for coca, there is a very large and still growing market for opium: pain killers. As the Senlis Council has relentlessly noted, medicinal opium licensing has been highly effective at stemming the violent and unregulated opium markets in Turkey and India, and that this same policy holds great promise for Afghanistan. Furthermore, with the growing incomes of India and China, a gigantic new market is emerging for the use of opiates as more and more people can afford to have more surgery, doctor’s visits, or even headaches.

Yet, in Afghanistan we only see the same old stale policies from the DEA: interdiction, spraying, military confrontation—and for the local villagers, severe impoverishment coupled with retribution crimes. These policies have done nothing to reduce the drug trade, clashes with armed non-governmental factions, or stability in Colombia, yet they are being exported to Central Asia as if they are success factors. This has happened while virtually next door success stories involving the opium trade go ignored.

I can’t escape a very unfortunate conclusion: we are deliberately angling for failure in Afghanistan. I don’t want to think that, as I genuinely believe that everyone wants it to succeed. But choosing to ignore or discount success stories in similar situations while importing a policy with a decades-long history of failure? I don’t get it.

Update: Oh look, Carl Robichaud has the chance to go to an actual discussion of outside-the-box thinking on counternarcotics and peace-building in Colombia and Afghanistan. I hope they came up with some decent ideas, but I don’t have high hopes that if they did anything would change. I wonder if they’ll use any work by the Senlis Council, which has been at the forefront of changing opium policy in Afghanistan.