Where to Go From Here

Karachi, Pakistan, is famous for its extremist madrassas—those religious schools which seem to foster extremism and have been used as a breeding ground for the Taliban. Yet the country is not sold on the fundamentalists—last month a recent 100,000-person march for secularism created a dramatic spectacle, though it was curiously underplayed in American media outlets.

Those marches, however, have (perhaps inextricably) become tied to the plight of Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Supreme Court judge dismissed on vague charges that stem from his refusal to bow meekly before Pervez Musharraf. It almost makes sense: in many ways, the push for democratic reform comes from the very same motivations that drive the push for a secular society (which is to be distinguished from an areligious one): the separation of the private and public, the right to live as one chooses, freedom from the control of others.

Though laudable in many ways, this intertwining has led to tragedy. For months now, dozens of people have been killed when they protest the treatment of Chaudhry, and the most recent march resulted in violent riots. Pakistani troops were ordered to shoot the rampaging mob, though that appears to be the only cause of death. But the march to support Chaudhry is also the same march to repel the Taliban’s Islamic courts—both are about the proper role of a limited government, and driving back the forces of oppression that have been percolating since at least 2001.

So what does this have to do with Central Asia? Musharraf’s inability to run his country properly has indirectly resulted in the much-covered unrest and extremism in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. Though he did not create these conditions, the miserable way in which they have been governed from afar has certainly made them worse. Cross-border traffic is barely restrained, and Islamabad’s inability to control or police the region (combined with its absolute insistence on denying U.S. and NATO troops pursuit rights when Taliban militants flee across) has created a safe haven for the insurgency. To handle this, rather than seeing how order might be achieved in an agreement with the elders and tribal leaders, Musharraf felt it prudent to withdraw and build a fence and lay mines along the border.

This would, naturally, create the unacceptable bifurcation of the Pashtuns. The border of Pakistan and Afghanistan—the Durand Line—was deliberately drawn in 1893 to break up several powerful Pashtun tribes, with the eventual result of a) radicalizing many Pashtuns due to their lowly status in Pakistani society, and b) rendering much of the border meaningless to them. No one has ever been able to stem unmonitored cross-border traffic, which was good for the mujahideen in the 80’s, good for the Taliban in the 90’s, and good for the Taliban resurgence today. It has acted as a spoiling agent on many attempts to pacify Afghanistan by foreigners.

Nevertheless, though it is a solution about as feasible as Israel’s wall with Palestine (meaning, not at all), Islamabad has gone forward with the attempt to construct the fence. Unsurprisingly, this has led to violent clashes with the Afghan army, as they dislike the idea of a wall permanently separating them from their brethren.

So, what to do from here? The border situation must be resolved. Afghanistan is starting to reach a tipping point, in which either the internationally-funded development finally begins to achieve its objectives, or the entire country descends into horrid chaos once more. Building a fence to cut off tribes from each other is not a viable solution to the violence, just as simply indiscriminately bombing areas of combat is not a viable solution for long-term stability.

Similarly, creating a new state—Pashtunistan—is not realistic, as neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan would cede the territory. In current conditions, too, the open border is not acceptable, but neither is building a fence.

I see the ultimate solution as development. Afghanistan critically needs more aid money, and smarter development projects. It also needs to have that aid channeled through the government, as foreigners imposing their will on the country has a miserable history. Development for Afghans by Afghans, with serious attention paid to local concerns, needs, and drives, is one major step that can be taken.

The Pakistani side of the border, however, is more complex. The provinces in question suffer from historical underinvestment due to their extreme isolation and prickly tribal politics. They are not, however, ungovernable—working through tribal elders, gaining consent and trust, and so on, have track records of success. I do not yet have any in-depth knowledge, however, of the area. Aside from the British colonial texts, my knowledge of the specific dynamics and histories in play is limited.

I do know, however, that the current situation is not static. The violent extremism is not a permanent feature of the area, though it does have deep roots (early explorers had to disguise themselves as Muslims to avoid summary execution). Even if it remains cut off, even if it remains deeply xenophobic, Pashtunistan was not always the expansionist, hyper-violent basket case it is now. I’m certain it can be nudged back to a more reasonable course, I just don’t know where to begin reading about it.

So… any readers have an idea where we can go from here?