A Sea Change in the Desert
There are some extraordinary changes happening in Turkmenistan. Unless there are some super-secret talks going on, it seems President Bush is content to allow Russia and Iran to be the major players in Turkmenistan, rather than any western governments. Indeed, Iran has made public its intention to strengthen economic ties with the country, including the start of direct flights between Ashgabat and Tehran. Everyone save the U.S., it seems, wants better ties.
This has big implications for energy markets in the South Caspian. For a few months now the big worry has actually been Iran’s crashing oil exports (itself the object of much handwringing from the U.S. foreign policy establishment)—its economy has been stagnant for so long it never invested in modernizing or expanding its oil production. So, in about 8 years or so, exports could drop to zero—with fascinating implications for things like its quest for supposedly peaceful nuclear energy (a few nuclear reactors would be cheaper and more environmentally friendly to build than throwing tens of billions of dollars into oil projects like refinery updates).
So, Iran is pushing its hand in Turkmenistan. Russia has maintained its interest in keeping its place as the primary export market for Turkmen natural gas. At the same time, Turkmenistan itself has shown some promising changes. In addition to the minor steps Stomatologbashi has taken, such as opening a few Internet cafés, he seems to be ever-so-cautiously dismantling some of the personality cult built by Niyazov. I don’t think this means they’re a few years away from open elections, but it does mean the some of the more damaging aspects of Turkmen society may be fading away.
The strange thing is, Niyazov’s “Turkmenbashi” cult was, at least structurally, similar to the Kim cult in North Korea. But Turkmenistan wasn’t nearly as harshly isolationist, or uniformity-oriented, as East Asia’s hermit kingdom. So, while everyone went through the motions of bowing before Niyazov’s portraits, you didn’t see the universal freak out over his death—merely the requisite references to “such a great leader” while people get their bearings.
Encouraging, too, is the abolition of the loath of loyalty. This opens the possibility, however distant or improbable, that a legit, moderate opposition party might one day be allowed into the country—the return of the exiles who were forced out under the grinding totalitarianism of Niyazov. The initial signs of opening, at least with regard to Iran and Russia (and Turkey, which could prove key to U.S. policy makers) might also portend some positive changes not just in Turkmenistan, but in the South Caspian in general. It will be an exciting 12 months.
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Tags: Turkmenistan.
Posted by Joshua Foust on March 11th, 2007
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Comments
Time: 3/13/2007, 8:58 am
Very interesting comments. One thing, we may not need their gas, but we certainly don’t want them sending it through Iran. And a (larger) pipeline through Iran would diversify their customer base and would make good economic sense for them, which would be in their best interests.
Time: 3/14/2007, 5:12 am
Brian - exactly. We don’t personally need Turkmenistan’s gas, but helping Europe and China cut Russia out will benefit everyone in the long run. I think the U.S. can act as a third party benefactor, offering modernization and trade in exchange for an open gas market.
Time: 3/14/2007, 8:51 am
I see what you’re saying, and that is an advantage if we don’t screw it up. Trying to help Turkmenistan diversify its gas exports away from Russia is one thing, but actively trying to isolate Iran is another. The former is certainly in everyone’s benefit, but the latter is just dragging Turkmenistan into someone else’s argument.
I’m just saying that if we push too hard to try to prevent Turkmenistan from economically engaging Iran we won’t be acting in their best interests and won’t be looked at as a neutral 3rd party.
Time: 3/12/2007, 10:02 pm
Cf Ian’s post about the Turkmenistan conference at Harvard two weeks ago… Tom Simons, former State Department coordinator for aid to all the CIS countries (and Deputy Undersecretary before that, among other things) apparently spent a good long time on the phone with the political officer in Ashgabad and folks back in the State Department and gave a briefing on new policy.
While I doubt Bush could find Turkmenistan on a map, the State department, according to Simons, is very interested in cultivating new ties with Turkmenistan and has twice sent a Deputy Undersecretary (the highest level contact we’ve had with them in years) to Ashgabad since Turkmenbashi’s timely demise.
Simons did say, though, and I think Ian quoted him on this, that there is dissent in State between those who want to take a didactic approach with Ashgabad (as has largely failed in Uzbekistan) and those who prefer the carrot rather than the stick. At this point, they’re apparently working on a list of short and long term goals for Turkmenistan and both sides are shuttling diplomats back and forth to work out the details of some new agreements. We are, however, trying not to rub this in the Russian’s face, so we’re not making noise about it, and according to Simons, there is absolutely nothing in the works for airbases or military cooperation.
Simons made a very interesting point… although there’s a lot of ground to cover to create any kind of working relationship, we’re basically the only party in the mix who don’t want Turkmenistan’s gas–which puts us in a unique position to be able to advocate for reforms that are genuinely in the best interest of the Turkmen people (medicine, education, human rights, etc) without having to frame everything around gas and pipelines.