What Does The Afghan Government Think?

CFR conducted an interesting interview with Afghanistan’s ambassador to the U.S., Said Jawad. A highlight?

One reason for the security challenges that we’re facing in Afghanistan is terrorism, but it’s not that the terrorists or the Taliban are very strong. The fact is the Afghan government’s capabilities to deliver services and to provide protection are limited. Unless we enhance the capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services and to provide protection, just the military operation alone will not be successful. We can push aside the Taliban from a province. Then they will go to the neighboring province or they will go across the border and then come back.

It’s very important that the international community and the United States, our partner, invest in building the capacity of the Afghan government to hold the areas after they have been cleared of the presence of the terrorists. And also make sure there will be no frustration among ordinary Afghan citizens, because it’s been five years since the international community came to Afghanistan, but still only 6 percent of Afghans have access to electricity.

Hmm, that sounds weirdly familiar.

He goes on:

From the entire financial assistance that’s been given to Afghanistan, only 5 percent has been given to the Afghan government. Twelve percent of the funds have been given to the Afghan reconstruction trust fund established for Afghanistan. And we can withdraw money under certain conditions. The remaining 82 or 83 percent of the assistance has been spent outside the budget and control of the Afghan government. This is a problem.

That sounds a lot like my latest TCS article. But that’s not to brag (really)—Afghanistan faces some tremendous challenges, and the point of what both Mr. Jawad and I are saying is that simply throwing money at the country will not fix anything.

Related: Afghan opium at record levels. Dealing with the opium trade is going to be the great, dark horse in all of this. I really do think that with enough muddling NATO will get the whole idea of the reconstruction teams worked out, maybe even with some permanence. But there has been not even a hint of straying from a Colombian-style eradication campaign. Until that changes, Afghanistan will remain deepy troubled.

At issue, too, is Mr. Jawad’s dancing around the subject of Pakistan. Cheney’s warning to Musharraf this past week was severe (and admittedly curious). The U.S. government is starting—finally—to let him know he cannot allow elements of his government to continue to train spoilers and send them across the border. Yet diplomatic concerns prevent the Afghan government from more than petulant arm crossing and gentle coaxing. No matter how Karzai hems and haws in public, where it matters—the actual contacts between governments—there is precious little action from Islamabad. An example? The same day the government brags about catching a former minister for the Taliban, extremists behead the teacher at a madrassa on suspicion he might have spied for the U.S. They have a long, long way to go.