Under a German initiative, the European Union would open four missions in Central Asian capitals. The missions would be in Bishkek, Dushanbe, Almaty, and Tashkent. The document in which this is found also proposes a heavy EU investment in the region to achieve a “breakthrough” in relations with the region, particularly over energy issues. (ITAR-TASS makes it sound as if this is all set in stone, but this may simply be a German proposal that is yet to be agreed upon.)
The most controversial part of the German proposal to massively increase European engagement with Central Asia is the renewal of ties with Uzbekistan, against which the EU currently has sanctions. Those sanctions are set to be discussed in May, and Uzbekistan has made hollow positive gestures (while also making substantive negative ones) most likely in the hopes that it will convince European politicians on the fence and bolster the positions of those calling for the sanctions to be dropped.
The realpolitik logic driving Germany’s position that Europe should engage Central Asia, particularly the three energy-rich states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, is quite strong. Europe is in a difficult position having to rely so heavily on Russia’s pipelines for the transport of natural gas. And on a lesser point, it is largely true to say that Western shunning of Central Asian governments leaves them few options but to turn to Russia and China, neither of which give two figs about human rights or economic reforms. And with potential reserves of 5 billion metric tons of oil and condensate and 5.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas,* it makes little sense to leave Uzbekistan out of a Central Asia strategy that is centered on energy. And not leaving it out means dropping the sanctions, which plenty, including myself, have argued to have been completely ineffective.
Human rights activists respond to this call for re-engagement with Uzbekistan by arguing that Europe has not taken the sanctions seriously enough.
Two HRW representatives suggested a major factor in the sanctions’ ineffectiveness has been the EU’s half-hearted approach toward enforcement. “Sanctions were never given a chance to work,” said Rachel Denber, deputy director of HRW’s Europe and Central Asia Division, during a recent Open Forum hosted by the Open Society Institute in New York.
Denber and Andrea Berg, the head of the Tashkent office of Human Rights Watch, claim that the Uzbek government will respond to greater pressure, though the EurasiaNet does not whether or not the two explained why greater pressure from the West would work.
At neweurasia Nick points to another condemnation of EU engagement with Uzbekistan, this time from the International Crisis Group’s Alain Délétroz. Quoting passages fails to really capture the totality of his message and passion, but all the same…
But has any good news reached us from Uzbekistan in the meantime? Has the repression of journalists, human rights defenders or non-governmental organisation members softened? Has the situation in the prisons, in the court rooms – where allegations of torture are never taken into account – improved? Or in the cotton fields, where children are obliged to work in conditions close to slavery? Has the level of small, daily humiliations Uzbeks must swallow from the heavy-handed police in any way diminished? And has the government accepted that a credible independent commission can investigate in Andijan as the EU has demanded from the beginning?
Unfortunately to all these questions the blunt and short answer is ‘no’.
That is certainly true. He goes on to ask what Europe hopes to get in return for softening its stance other than to be “treated like a third-rank power by a provincial despot.”**
Putting aside the arguments against engaging Uzbekistan — and there are very good ones — for a moment, that last bit I have quoted brings up a few points worth mentioning.
Nick brings this up himself. There is an inconsistency in approaches to repressive states, and I would add that there is an inconsistency in rhetoric.
Mr. Deletroz characterization of Karimov as a “provincial despot” not treating his European betters with the respect they deserve is a step above the usual rhetoric of criticisms of Uzbekistan, but it highlights the issue. Is the standard for characterizing Uzbekistan’s government this way the behavior or that it rules over a distant land with a funny name? Perhaps it is just that it does not have the good PR departments that China, Iran, Cuba, and the Palestinian Authority apparently have. I appreciate the vast differences between all of these places, but the standards for discussion are undeniably different. It is absolutely worth debating whether or not this is fair, and in the case of Uzbekistan, which I would say has a wee bit of a complex about its place in the world, one of critical importance to diplomacy.
There is a policy disconnect as well. Josh mentioned this the other day. It seems to be almost uncritically accepted that in some cases isolation works while in others engagement will usher in a new age of wonders. The record is mixed, but it seems pretty clear that sanctions and isolation do not work.
Nick also discusses policy, pointing out something interesting about dissonance between Mr. Deletroz’s position on Europe and Uzbekistan and a recently published ICG position on the US and Iran.
It is also indicative of an attitude of ‘one rule for some – one rule for others’ as the e-mail from ICG which alerted me to this piece also carries news of an Middle East briefing paper (No. 21), titled Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency, which states in its overview:
‘By signalling its openness to broad engagement with Iran without preconditions on the nuclear issue, Iraq and bilateral relations, the U.S. would be rendering a far greater and wiser service both to itself and to the region as a whole.’
I appreciate the differences between Iran and Uzbekistan, between the USA and EU, between human rights* and the nuclear issue – but if the ICG is urging the US to negotiate with Iran (on whom it has imposed sanctions) then surely the EU can also negotiate with Uzbekistan, on whom it has, er, imposed sanctions?
He acknowledges that it may be unfair to compare Mr. Deletroz’s position with this ICG position on Iran, but he is right. This is absolutely worth discussion. Why is engagement appropriate in the case of Iran, but the wrong strategy for Uzbekistan? Why should we expect strong European sanctions against Uzbekistan to work when US sanctions against Iran have accomplished little? Why should there be no preconditions with negotiations on Iran over a high-stakes issue of huge international importance while Uzbekistan is held to a higher standard?
Maybe I shouldn’t question my European betters…***
Anyhow, there are very good reasons to avoid or at the very least be cautious about engagement with Uzbekistan. The first is that, for all the poor implementation from the US side, US engagement with Uzbekistan achieved very little. In fact, the most important lesson for Europe, if energy is the reason for the engagement, is that US companies still avoided Uzbekistan like the plague despite the warm relations. It simply is no place to do business. And even if Europe merely wants to be a purchaser of Uzbek energy, it should keep in mind that the current government has done little in over 15 years of independence to show that it is a reliable partner to anyone.
Europe’s expectations for results from either sanctions or engagement should be very low. Neither proponents of engagement nor advocates of sanctions should suggest that their approach will achieve much in the way of anything. To do anything else is simply dishonest.
*These optimistic numbers come from James P. Dorian, “Central Asia: A major emerging energy player in the 21st century,” Energy Policy 34 (2006) 544-555.
**I mean, seriously, why would any state treat European foreign policy as toothless and ineffectual? They can draft some pretty mean memos and their looks of disapproval are absolutely whithering!
***I’m willing to accept that I may have issues with Europeans after having listened to so many exchange students over the years claim they are so much wiser and culturally superior to the United States.
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***I’m willing to accept that I may have issues with Europeans after having listened to so many exchange students over the years claim they are so much wiser and culturally superior to the United States.
I had a problem with Mr Délétroz’s superior tone as well – and I’m European! Anyhoos, great piece Nathan, but I hadn’t quite intended to make a direct comparison between EU-Uzbek relations and US-Iranian relations but rather between two strands of EU diplomacy, on Iran and Uzbekistan. Mr Deletroz, for his part, also pointed out, somewhat snarkily I felt, that unlike the EU, the US hadn’t even bothered imposing sanctions on Uzbekistan in the first place …
Nathan, Thank you for a really interesting analysis. I think one reason Iran gets more respect may be that–unlike Uzbekistan–it has not renounced the use of nuclear weapons, has gone to war with its neighbors, funds terrorists around the world, and appeals to religious fanaticism. In other words, Iran scares the Europeans in ways that the Central Asian nations don’t…plus, I think Iran still is a trading partner for some EU countries…so, chalk it up to fear and greed. Uzbekistan is poor and weak, so the EU can kick it around (until Russia and China tell it to lay off).
I think Laurence might be right, but I’m not so cynical about Europe’s motives. Another reason for Iran getting a different kind of rhetoric from Europe has to do with the different traditions at work. On the one hand, Uzbekistan gets the old Cold War treatment–Deletroz’s words come right out of the critique of Soviet human rights. Since the seventies this has pretty much been the default position of both the left and right in Europe. Iran, on the other hand, gets the post-colonial guilt complex that says that countries outside of Europe have be treated with respect and So, it’s not so much that Uzbekistan is we
Ugh, misclicked there. Second try.
I think Laurence might be right, but I’m not so cynical about Europe’s motives. Another reason for Iran getting a different kind of rhetoric from European (and American) intellectuals has to do with the different traditions at work. On the one hand, Uzbekistan gets the old Cold War treatment–Deletroz’s words come right out of the critique of Soviet human rights. Since the seventies this has pretty much been the default position of both the left and right in Europe. Iran, on the other hand, gets the post-colonial guilt complex that says that all countries outside of Europe have be treated with respect and on the level. It’s not so much that Uzbekistan is weak and Iran is strong–which is true, and I guess it might play a role in the kind of statements ICG makes–but that it’s easy to criticize a very Soviet-like dictator and difficult to dismiss a real regional force with a history of being abused by the West, like Iran.
Nick, I consider anyone from the UK only “technically European”
I got were saying, but I may have written in such a way that it seemed so. But it is interesting to note, as Josh did, that the US has its own set of policy double-standards.
His comment about the US not passing sanctions also bothered me. Diplomacy and policy-making aren’t dick waving contests, and European policy toward Uzbekistan has nothing to do with the US one way or the other. It’s fairly safe to take Germany at its word when it says that energy is the reason to engage and not that it’s using that as a cover for it having cold feet over the US not levying sanctions. Europe might not seem so reliant on the US in international policy if so many didn’t obsess over it all the time. On top of that, the US has shown a bit of virtue that Europe has failed to emulate.
Anyhow, Ian, I think that you’re right about the cold war vs. colonial difference to a degree. I don’t think it necessarily accounts for public rhetoric though, as you note.
Nick and Nathan, Thank you for your interesting comments. Someone should do a study of this–especially since some of the very same people are involved in US policy formation vis-a-vis Iran (for example, Michael McFaul) as Russia and Central Asia. Curiously, if Ian is right, it means that Uzbekistan is being treated as a Soviet-type threat even though the USSR is no more and it wishes to pursue a more neutral course; while Iran is being treated as a victim of colonialism, even as it poses a direct threat to Western interests and seeks confrontation. Again, the EU policy appears to appease an agressor–while kicking the vanquished…That’s bullying, not leadership, IMHO.
I think the problem you run into as well is that the EU wants slightly different things from UZ and Iran. Let’s face it, Iran is a major, global supplier of oil. Even though Uzbekistan has a respectable production, it is tiny in comparison, and at best could only serve as a supplement or slight offset from other sources.
Plus, as has been noted, Iran possesses, or shall soon possess, nuclear weapons. A wealth of rare minerals (oil) plus apocalyptic weapons (nukes) makes the stakes far higher with Tehran than with Tashkent. Indeed, Europe, even more than the U.S., has a compelling reason to quickly resolve the crisis in Iran in a peaceful manner; it has the luxury of taking its time with Uzbekistan, or so it thinks.
I’m sure none of us are blind to the inroads Russia, China, and even India have made into Central Asia. Europe and the U.S. are not the only economic powerhouses looking for ways to peacefully engage these countries and extract some kind of financial windfall. As Nathan noted, neither Russia nor China care about human rights (China having proved this with its recent interest-free loans to Sudan), and India has at best been sanguine on the subject. Worse, unlike Europe, which at least in theory is a natural ally of the U.S. and should have analogous interests, Russia, China, and India all have slightly divergent interests, though one in common: reducing the power and influence of the U.S. in their respective regions.
I grow uncomfortable with such state-level politiking, because it requires a lot of shortcuts, but it does closely match what is actually happening in the region.
I think we can’t avoid a certain degree of engagement: geography dictates relations with these regimes. And, cynical though it may be, we can’t accept their permanent alienation because there is too much to gain from economic cooperation. Perhaps a slight easing of sanctions, in exchange for more rigorous business and commerce laws? Say, dealing with the currency nightmare, the bad import laws, and fixing some of the state banks so they have a credit rating? That would be a good start.
Hell, China got a slow start with its capitalism programs. These things take time, and it’s not very fair or realistic to expect a full and equitable solution to happen in six months, or even in time for the next election. You have to take a longer view with dictatorships.
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