Registan.net

Germany is oft seen as the unsung hero of Afghanistan: there from almost the very start, it has taken a major role in the NATO operations throughout the country, cleverly avoiding the violence in the southern regions while busying itself with the more easily laudable reconstruction efforts up north. However, an interesting series of critical essays in Der Spiegel throws some water on that percpetion.

Right now there is a major debate within the Bundestag over the plight of Murat Kurnaz, a Turkish citizen of German birth on his way to becoming a German citizen when he was arrested in Pakistan and languished in Guantanamo for four years (Kurnaz was born before Germany adjusted its citizenship requirements). He has accused members of the KSK, or the German Special Forces, of torture—a charge not exactly refuted by the KSK, though they admit to meeting with him. Kurnaz’s case is important because he was arrested on suspicion, but it took more than four years of imprisonment for the U.S. and German governments to realize he had no ites to radical Islamism… at the very least, an embarrassing mistake that should result in nothing but apologies.

But Kurnaz is really just a catalyst. His claim that he was abused by German soldiers in Kandahar has sparked a national reflection on the country’s role in Afghanistan, and whether they should bother themselves with the messy anti-Taliban campaign in the southern provinces. The little violence the Germans have seen already have led to intense embarrassment, as when German soldiers were caught posing for photographs with human skulls—a disturbing image, given Germany’s past (which isn’t at all incidental: the past weighs quite heavily in debates on military deployment).

What seems to gall the Germans even more are the accusations by the U.S., Canada, Dutch, and British, that the Germans are avoiding their fair share of responsibility for the fighting.

Germans would argue that they already are doing all they can. Not only do Germans have troops committed to hotspots around the world, but those in Afghanistan are responsible for huge swathes of the north. “The north is extremely important, and they do it well,” Nuland praises.

Plus, as Stephan Bierling, professor of international politics at Regensburg University, argues, “German politicians and the German public believe that security has only a financial price and that participation in multinational operations is a value in itself.”

On the ground in Afghanistan, though, the point of view is slightly different. There have been more attacks against NATO forces this year than any other since the 2001 US invasion. And opium production now accounts for some 60 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, according to an estimate earlier this month by Supreme Allied Commander US General James Jones. The Taliban, he indicated, weren’t shy about profiting from the drug trade. “We’re losing ground and it bothers me,” he said.

Other military leaders in the country have pointed to the [German] caveats as being partially responsible for the loss of ground. Indeed, even as ISAF commanders have some 31,000 troops at their disposal, they are limited in their ability to move them around as necessary.

It obviously is not an easy issue. Germany apparently wants to contribute, but not to the fighting necessary to re-rout the Taliban in the south.

Ahmed Rashid, naturally, finds a way to blame the Americans for the German’s hesitation—pointing to the reinvigorated Taliban, the boom in opium production, and the lack of focus on political and social reforms.

Since 2001, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan has failed to deploy enough peacekeeping troops, resources and reconstruction aid. NATO is only now rectifying that, spreading troops out to key areas in the south that have been hit by the insurgency and developing a more clear- headed reconstruction policy.

But NATO members have been slow to come up with the necessary financial aid and military equipment. Major reconstruction has yet to take place. Even in Kabul there is less electricity today than there was under the Communists in the 1980s.

Huh. So the Americans have naturally bungled it, even though the other NATO countries, loathe to spend their money and personnel on such a mission, balk? I’m the first to criticize the American efforts in the country (and I have, repeatedly, in this space), but Rashid is glossing over the responsibility other NATO members play here. He is right in that the U.S. has not placed either Islamabad or Kabul under sufficient pressure to stem the corruption or cross border traffic… but the blame has to flow to the other countries involved as well.

Like Germany. A few troops is great, especially if they’re helping to secure the northern bit of the country. But Afghanistan is far more than the Northern Alliance, and if Germany wishes its effort to not be seen as a waste it needs to contribute to the difficult work down south. Hiding out in the safer zones can no longer cut it.

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